



Year 13 A Level Geography Paper 2 Unit 3 – Superpowers

EQ1 – What are Superpowers

Readings



Softly does it

The awesome influence of Oxbridge, One Direction, and the Premier League Jul 18th, 2015



HOW many rankings of global power have put Britain at the top and China at the bottom? Not many, at least this century. But on July 14th an index of "soft power"—the ability to coax and persuade—ranked Britain as the mightiest country on Earth. If that was unexpected, there was another surprise in store at the foot of the 30-country index: China, four times as wealthy as Britain, 20 times as populous and 40 times as large, came dead last.

Diplomats in Beijing won't lose too much sleep over the index, compiled by Portland, a London-based PR firm, together with Facebook, which provided data on governments' online impact, and ComRes, which ran opinion polls on international attitudes to different countries. But the ranking gathered some useful data showing where Britain still has outsized global clout.

Britain scored highly in its "engagement" with the world, its citizens enjoying visa-free travel to 174 countries—the jointhighest of any nation—and its diplomats staffing the largest number of permanent missions to multilateral organisations, tied with France. Britain's cultural power was also highly rated:


though its tally of 29 UNESCO World Heritage sites is fairly ordinary, Britain produces more internationally chart-topping music albums than any other country, and the foreign following of its football is in a league of its own (even if its national teams are not). It did well in education, too—not because of its schools, which are fairly mediocre, but because its universities are second only to America's, attracting vast numbers of foreign students.

Britain fared least well on enterprise, mainly because it spends a feeble 1.7% of GDP on research and development (South Korea, which came top, spends 4%). And the quality of its governance was deemed ordinary, partly because of a gender gap that is wider than that of most developed countries, as measured by the UN. Governance was the category that sank undemocratic China, whose last place was sealed by a section dedicated to digital soft-power—tricky to cultivate in a country that restricts access to the web. The political star of social media, according to the index, is Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, whose Facebook page generates twice as many comments, shares, and thumbs-ups as that of Barack Obama.

The index will cheer up Britain's government, which has lately been accused of withdrawing from the world. But many of the assets that pushed Britain to the top of the soft-power table are in play. In the next couple of years the country faces a referendum on its <u>membership of the EU</u>; a <u>slimmer role for the BBC</u>, its prolific public broadcaster; and a continuing <u>squeeze on immigration</u>, which has already made its universities less attractive to foreign students. Much of Britain's hard power was long ago given up. Its soft power endures—for now.

Introduction:

Power – both economic and political is unevenly distributed. Some countries have a disproportionate influence over regional and global decision making, whereas others have little influence. The geography of power changes over time. Some nations gain power and influence, while others lose it. Equally, the nature of power has changed, from direct to more subtle indirect control, through trade, culture flows of capital and resources.



Superpowers, Past, Present and Future:

Some countries and country groupings are emerging as powerful forces and may attain superpower status in the future. The EU and China are key contenders with Russia, India, Brazil, and the oil rich Gulf states powerful in particular ways. Other countries fulfil regional power roles.

The Characteristics of Superpowers:

A superpower is a nation, or group of nations, with a leading position in international politics. From the mid-19th century to the early 20th century the UK was arguably the world's superpower, having successfully created a global empire with strong links, which it then defended against challenges by other European countries. However, following the intervention of the USA in two world wars, that country started to emerge as a superpower, challenged by Russia during the Cold War. The USA established sole authority during the Cold War, but the long term legacy of change, especially through the globalisation of freedom and democracy, meant that with each continent a number of countries can now claim to have significant influence.

These **regional powers** include countries such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Chile, Australia, India and within Europe, Germany, and the UK. As a resurgent China benefits from its own unique twist on capitalism, some see its wealth and influence as a future challenge to the USA's status as the primary global economic superpower.

The USA vs China according to TIME Magazine (2015):

- The USA's per capita GPD was \$53,000 compared to China's \$6,000. (Note that there are other ways to measure GPD and they suggest the gap is smaller)
- 80% of all financial transactions are in USD.

- The USA's military spending is four to five times that of China, accounting for 37% of global military spending.
- The USA is the most favoured destination for migration 45 million people living in the USA were born in a foreign country, four times that of the next highest country.
- 16/20 of the world's top Universities are in the USA.

Hard vs. Soft Power

Countries also have a number of tools at their disposal in terms of extending their global influence and maintaining their power. These mechanisms of maintaining power sit on a spectrum from 'hard' to 'soft' power and vary in their effectiveness. 'Hard' power is defined as power through force or coercion and is likely to involve military power or economic sanctions. For example, Britain's expansionist policy in the imperial era would be considered 'hard' power, as would military actions have taken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Economic sanctions such as those taken against Iran to try to prevent it from developing its military nuclear capability would also be an example of 'hard' power. 'Soft' power, on the other hand, is exerting influence through favour and persuasion, and is therefore likely to be based on cultural power. The global dominance of the USA through TNCs such as Coca Cola and McDonald's, as well as media, TV, films, etc. would all be examples of 'soft' power. It is argued that true superpowers need to combine both a 'hard' and 'soft' power approach to become a 'smart' power.

The use of different types of power is necessary because:

- Invasions, war and conflict are very blunt instruments. They often do not go as planned and fail to achieve the aims of those exercising hard power.

- Soft power alone may not persuade one nation to do as another says, especially if they are culturally and ideologically very different.

Hard power	Economic power	Soft power
	The spectrum of power	
 Military action and conquest, or the threat of it The creation of alliances, both economic and military, to marginalise some nations The use of economic sanctions to damage a nation's economy 	 Economic or development aid from one nation to another Signing favourable trade agreements to increase economic ties 	 The cultural attractiveness of some nations, making it more likely that others will follow their lead The values and ideology of some nations being seen as appealing The moral authority of a nation's foreign policy

The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations

Jan-Philipp N E Wagner, May 14, 2014

This content was written by a student and assessed as part of a university degree. E-IR publishes student essays & dissertations to allow our readers to broaden their understanding of what is possible when answering similar questions in their own studies.

The first part of this essay explains the concepts of hard and soft power with referring to their combination, soft power. Then, the effectiveness of the two concepts is assessed by discussing different examples of their use in foreign policy making. This discussion also includes examples for the use of smart power. The essay states that soft power is the more effective and efficient concept in contemporary global politics because of its endurance and sustainability. Hard power, however, is less useful today as the global system changes in its disfavour. In addition to soft power, smart power strategies play an important role in the contemporary international system.

The idea to distinguish between hard power and soft power was first introduced by Nye more than two decades ago (1990). In general, he defines power as the "ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants" (2009, p. 61) and command or hard power as coercive power wielded through inducements or threats (2009, p. 63). Hard power is based on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions (Wilson, 2008, p. 114) and relies on tangible power resources such as armed forces or economic means (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 29). Thus, the German invasion into Poland in 1939 and the UN economic sanctions against Iraq in 1991 following the first Gulf War are examples for the use of hard power.

In contrast, co-optive or "soft power is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants" (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). According to Nye, persuasive power is based on attraction and emulation and "associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions" (2009, p. 63). Cooper emphasises the importance of legitimacy for the concept of soft power (2004, p. 173). State activities need to be perceived as legitimate in order to enhance soft power. The dispersion of American culture within the Eastern bloc during the Cold War indicate the existence of American soft power and more recent processes of EU enlargement are indices for soft power possessed by the EU (cf. Nye, 2009, pp. 63-64).

The concept of hard and soft power is a continuum with several instruments of different degrees of coercion or persuasion. These instruments are punishment, compulsion, inducement, agenda setting, persuasion and attraction (cf. Smith-Windsor, 2000, p. 52).

The effectiveness of hard and soft power approaches depends on the accessibility of power resources (see Heywood, 2011, Figure 9.1). Large states such as the USA or Russia with a higher national income are financially able to maintain large armed forces and to put other states economically under pressure. For smaller states, these traditional tools of hard power are more difficult to obtain. The accessibility of soft power resources though depends much less on the size of a state. As the example of Norway shows, small states have definitely the ability to build soft power (cf. Nye, 2004, pp. 111-112; and Leonard, 2002, p.53).

Heng, however, explains the importance of the nature of soft power resources in his comparison of Japanese and Chinese soft power strategies. He stresses for example that Japan's war history forms the main limitation to its soft power (2010, p. 299), whereas China's "competitive state-led model and its authoritarian political system" hinder the full utilisation of its soft power potential (ibid., p. 300). Hence, a state's given soft power resources – such as its historical legacy and societal system – determine the strength and therefore the effectiveness of its soft power.

Another important aspect of the hard-soft-power continuum is time. It appears that generating hard power requires much less time as its resources are tangible. In contrast, soft power takes relatively long to build as its intangible resources develop over a long period of time. Similarly, the temporal dimension of the gain of hard power and soft power strategies differs while military or economic coercion tends to result in an immediate but short-duration outcome, attraction and persuasion have the tendency to cause longterm change. This is due to an inherent aspect of the concept: as hard power forces one to act in a way different to one's usual behaviour, one does so involuntarily. On the contrary, soft power changes one's attitude to the end that one acts voluntarily in a way different to one's usual behaviour. Gallarotti stresses that hard power evokes compelled action, whereas soft power induces voluntary action. Furthermore, he states that compulsion leads to conflict and voluntariness to consent (2011, p. 30) which explains why soft power solutions tend to last longer than hard power solutions. For example, the repressive measures put onto Germany after the Great War provoked another World War, whereas the soft power used to construct the European Union resulted in almost 70 years of Europe-wide peace.

Smith-Windsor argues that the borders between hard and soft power blur (2000). He stresses that armed forces can also be "called to participate in humanitarian and interposition peacekeeping operations" expressing the attractiveness of military means (2000, p. 53). The use of armed forces is, according to him, therefore, not to be seen at the hard power pole of the hard-soft-power continuum.

Indeed, some foreign policy strategies may be perceived as effective combinations of the two poles of the power continuum. This idea was taken up and coined "smart power" by Nossel (cf. Nossel, 2004) and Nye (cf. Nye, 2004). Armitage and Nye state in 2007 that smart power draws from both hard and soft power resources (p. 7). They define the concept as "an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions" (ibid.). According to Wilson, smart power is "the capacity (...) to combine elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing" (2008, p. 115).

Moving on from the definitional part of this paper. The characteristics of the contemporary world order weaken the effectiveness of hard power strategies. Based on Nye (1990), Hackbarth defines the following characteristics (2008, pp. 2-3): globalisation-driven economic interdependence; the rise of transnational actors; the resurgence of nationalism in weak states; the spread of military technology; and the changed nature of international political problems. In 2008, Nye added the wide-spread access to information to this list (p. 99) and Gallarotti stresses that also the growth of democracy hinders the effectiveness of hard power (2011, p. 40).

An example for the ineffectiveness of basing foreign policy making solely on hard power strategies is the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003. According to Steinberg, "the strategy [of the

invasion of Iraq] failed to understand what elements of power were needed most to defeat the emerging threat" from terrorist groups (2008, p. 159). This misunderstanding resulted in ignoring two key elements of soft power: the Bush administration firstly forgot about the USA's dependence on their allies' intelligence and policy forces and on global public support; and secondly, the question of the legitimacy of the invasion was not attributed any importance (ibid., p. 160). In the short term, these mistakes led to the failure of the action. In the long term, they have caused the degradation of American soft power as "the strategy undermined the U.S. global position" (ibid., p. 160) and "global public confidence in U.S. leadership" (ibid., p. 157). The USA felt the endurance of this damage for instance when facing problems of their development aid programs in Africa (cf. Hackbarth, 2008; and see below).

Due to the above mentioned factors limiting the effectiveness of hard power, it is hard to find successful foreign policies solely based on hard power resources. Many states now enact soft power rather than hard in its external relations. India's foreign policy for instance is presently within the process of this transition. Wagner lists two main reasons for this transition: On the one hand, "India's hard power approach of the 1970s and 1980s was not very successful" (Wagner, 2005, p. 2); and on the other hand, the economic advancement after 1991 facilitated the use of economic tools in foreign policy (ibid.). This explanation mirrors some of the above mentioned factors triggering the decline in the use of hard power.

On the other hand, also the concept of soft power has its weak points. Cooper lists three points of weakness. He firstly questions the strength of culture as a soft power resource as cultural influence does not equal political power (2004, p. 170). Secondly, the desirability of the outcomes of soft power strategies depends on particular circumstances which cannot necessarily be influenced by states (ibid., p. 171). Finally, he challenges the actual benefit of agenda setting as the positive results of those practices seem to occur long after their originators' demises (ibid., p. 171).

The U.S. Africa Command can be seen as an unsuccessful soft power strategy. According to Morrison and Hicks, it was initially set up for three reasons: oil, terrorism and ungoverned spaces in Africa, and China's increased influence in Africa (2007, p. 1). Despite these hard power reasons, AFRICOM was sold as a soft power strategy which resulted in the perception of imperialist intentions the USA might pursue in Africa (Hackbarth, 2008, pp. 9-10). Together with the isochronal Iraq invasion, this perception damaged the American soft power.

Nevertheless, ineffective soft power strategies are usually the exception. The following examples show how soft power can be used effectively. The first example is the European Union and its ability to attract new members. The EU is a leading intergovernmental organisation and its success generates among non-members states the desire to participate in the project of European integration. Based on this promising foundation, the EU's "soft power derives from its readiness to offer a seat at the decision making table" (Cooper, 2004, pp. 179-180). This attractiveness assures peace and safety among European states and the process of EU enlargement further strengthens its position at the global level. Thus, the EU's soft power is beneficial for its member states as well as for the EU itself.

Volunteering and intercultural exchanges appear to be another kind of soft power that is increasingly used in today's global politics. Rieffel and Zalud describe the positive effect of volunteering from an American perspective as follows:

Overseas volunteer work is a form of soft power that contributes measurably to the security and well-being of Americans. Volunteers (...) contribute to institutional capacity building, social capital, democratic governance, and a respect for human rights, all of which help to make the world a safer place for Americans both at home and abroad. (2006, p. 1)

Thus, volunteering is beneficial for both the host and the home countries as it promotes intercultural understanding and therefore conflict prevention.

An example for employed smart power is the US-American effort to strengthen its influence in Africa. According to Hackbarth (2008, pp. 6-10), this strategy embodies three instruments:

(i) the African Growth and Opportunity Act is a program of bilateral trade agreements bound to certain political, economic, and social reforms (ibid., pp. 6-7).

(ii) the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is "the largest commitment ever by a single nation towards an international health initiative" (The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 2009, p. 1). The program provides financial means to realise national policies combatting AIDS/HIV (Hackbarth, 2008, pp. 6-7).

(iii) the Millennium Challenge Corporation is a financial aid program "based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people" (The MCC 2008 cited in Hackbarth, 2008, p. 8).

These three programs have in common that they combine the attractiveness of money with the demand for political, social, and economic development. The underlying principle is simple: in order to be eligible for partaking in the programs, a state has to meet the conditions set by the USA. Because the attractiveness of money is such a strong persuasive tool this type of development aid is a good example for an effective smart power strategy. As Mead states, "the generosity of U.S. humanitarian assistance abroad enhances U.S. soft power" (2004, p. 51).

Hard power is coercive power executed through military threats and economic inducements and based on tangible resources such as the army or economic strength. In contrast, soft power is persuasive power deriving from attraction and emulation and grounded on intangible resources such as culture. Although they are oppositional approaches to power, their combination, smart power, has its place in academic debate and policy making. Overall, it appears that soft power strategies are more effective in the contemporary international system than hard power strategies. The demise of hard power is caused by changes in the world order, whereas the strength of soft power is based on its endurance and sustainability. As soft power has weaknesses, too, it is worth considering the strength of smart power strategies.

"Diplomacy is the art of letting other people have your way"

Daniele Vare,20th century Italian author

How to become a soft power superpower

Tom Fletcher British diplomat and former HM Ambassador to Lebanon

It should be a rule of modern diplomacy that a British embassy can never have too many pictures of David Beckham on the wall. Ditto Argentina and Messi, Portugal, and Ronaldo. When I was a UK Ambassador, we never missed the chance to fly the largest flag we could find over a Bond car, super yacht, Royal Wedding, iconic brand, Premiership footballer, or visiting celeb. This was not because we were star struck, though perhaps we were a bit. It gave us the best possible platform for our message about Britain's global role. This was not treaties, Ferrero Rocher, or protocol. But it was diplomacy.

As the Second World War raged across Europe, a diplomatic adviser approached Josef Stalin – tentatively, as most people did. Stalin despised diplomats and saw diplomacy as an effeminate business of compromise and capitulation. He wanted to understand power, but only so that he could have more of it. Nevertheless, his nervous advisor wanted to make the case that the Soviet leader should stop repressing Catholics in order to reduce hostility to Russia in Europe and curry favour with the Vatican. Stalin was underwhelmed. "The pope? How many divisions does he have?"

Throughout history, many leaders have seen power as pure military might. The strength to conquer, intimidate and subdue, the art of survival. When you have power, you use it. When you're strong and winning, why compromise? When you are weak and losing, why compromise?

Of course, the Vatican had no tanks. But, unlike Stalin's system and Stalin's statues, it is still standing. Nations that succeed in the future will measure themselves by something more than the number of people they have the power to kill. And – though no one has yet told Donald Trump – diplomacy is more than a competition to secure the biggest arms deal.

Of course, wars are not going away anytime soon. Soft power without the threat of hard power quickly becomes "speak loudly and carry a small stick". "We will not stand idly by" quickly becomes "watch us standing idly by". As the 2014 Russia/Ukraine crisis demonstrated, "you must not invade your neighbour" becomes "you should not invade your neighbour", and then "let's discuss how we can ensure that you don't invade another neighbour."

But even the most brutal empires recognised the need to balance military and nonmilitary force. Genghis Khan would have been unlikely to describe anything he did as soft, nor appoint a soft power guru. But he realised that it was easier to maximise his own influence if people felt that they were better off with him than without him. He even invented diplomatic immunity. The Romans were also weak when they forgot the importance of bread and circuses, relying on subjugation alone. Instead, Rome was at its strongest when it offered a sense of magnetism, the early version of US President Reagan's "Shining City on a Hill".

Soft power alone is also insufficient. Like hard power, it has its limits, as photos of jihadists drinking Pepsi in Levi's jeans remind us. On visits to universities in the Middle East, I am

often harangued about Western cultural imperialism by students wearing Premiership football jerseys. So, any government now needs to think far more strategically about how to become a smart power superpower. Portland's league table is a competition that should matter, and not just to diplomats. In my experience, it comes down to three ideas: having a national story; knowing how to tell it; and knowing how and when to mix the tools at your disposal.

Firstly, know thyself. A nation needs to understand its own story and tell it well. That story is most effective when it is aspirational, inclusive, and does not rely only on killing people from other nations. It makes it easier for us to persuade others to support our agenda, on the basis that it is theirs too. It makes it easier for us to persuade others to share our values, because those values work for them too. And it makes it more likely that they buy our goods because they want them too. Danny Boyle's brilliant telling of Britain's island story during the 2012 Olympics opening ceremony moved many of us to tears, and a small number of bigots to rage. History is rightly contested, and any attempt to define a nation even more so.

Becoming a soft power superpower also means understanding how to tell that story. In the internet age, marketers can no longer simply pump out their messages. Instead, they must engage with those they want to influence, building trust. The same applies to nations, especially in a time of distrust in traditional institutions. The BBC is the world's most trusted broadcaster because it is committed to debate and inclusivity not propaganda and exclusivity. It sets out to be a global institution rather than a British one. The British Museum calls itself "a museum of the world, for the world." The English Premier League is the most international in the world.

A nation's brand is most credible when carried not by Ministers or diplomats but by sportsmen, artists, or businesses, and most importantly by people. It is often easier to promote modern British music rather than traditional British values, or the power of Premiership football rather than our position on human rights. Governments have to draw on the power of those that can best promote the national brand, while avoiding looking like an awkward uncle dancing at a wedding.

So, Conchita Wurst, Austria's transvestite winner of the Eurovision song contest in 2014, a glorious cross between Shirley Bassey and Russell Brand, did more for its reputation as an open and liberal country than years of government speeches and press releases. The Nobel Peace Prize will keep Norway near the top of the soft power league table as long as leaders aspire to win it. The 2014 World Cup in Brazil had a huge impact on Brazil's reputation, for better or worse.

However, governments can and should do more to refine the instruments directly under their control. This starts with greater coherence between development, defence, and foreign affairs ministries. Overseas aid should not be tied to foreign policy outcomes but should amplify a country's smart power. The fact that Britain funded all the schoolbooks in Lebanon gave me much more political credibility and access. When navies help deliver humanitarian aid following natural disasters, it increases the attraction of their government. Likewise, when diplomats secure and use influence, it is easier to deliver policy changes that help deliver development. There will naturally be tensions between these three arms of overseas work, but they must be creative tensions. The Obama Presidency was a struggle between competing visions of how you project power. By seeking to draw back many of the harder power instruments, which were overused by George W. Bush, the US faced charges of weakness and neglect. By "leading from behind", Obama created the sense of a driverless world. But he was right that "just because we have the biggest hammer does not mean every problem is a nail". The nations climbing the soft power table fastest get this. And they will be the superpowers of the Digital Age.

American soft power after Trump

Many subsequent polls have confirmed the findings of the 2017 and 2018 Soft Power 30 reports that American soft power has declined since the beginning of the Trump administration. "America First" may appeal to some Americans, but when applied in a narrow way, people abroad hear it as a demotion. Trump's tweets have helped him set the global agenda, but they do not produce soft power if they are not attractive to others. Some in the administration seem to believe that the soft power of attraction is irrelevant, only the hard power of military and economic instruments matters. When Trump's acting chief of staff, Mick Mulvaney, was budget director, he boasted about a hard power budget that would have slashed funding for the State Department and the US Agency for International Development by nearly 30 per cent. Fortunately, Congress restored some of the funds, but the struggle continues.

As Henry Kissinger once pointed out, international order depends not only on the balance of hard power, but also on perceptions of legitimacy, which depends crucially on soft power, and it becomes more important than ever in an information age. Information revolutions always have profound socioeconomic and political consequences – witness the dramatic effects of Gutenberg's printing press on Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One can date the current information revolution from the 1960s and the advent of "Moore's Law": the number of transistors on a computer chip doubles roughly every two years. A quarter of a century ago, there were about 50 websites in the world; today more than half the world is online, and that will likely grow to 5-6 billion people by 2020. Moreover, the "Internet of Things" will connect tens of billions of devices.

The explosion of information has produced a "paradox of plenty": an abundance of information leads to scarcity of attention. When the volume of information confronting people becomes overwhelming, it is hard to know what to focus on. Social media algorithms are designed to compete for attention. Reputation becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles, informed by social and ideological affinities, often centre on the creation and destruction of credibility. Social media can make false information look more credible if it comes from "friends." As US Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election showed, this enabled Russia to weaponise American social media.

Reputation has always mattered in world politics, but credibility has become an even more important power resource. Information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned but may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country's reputation for credibility – and thus reduces its soft power. Trump is notoriously careless with facts. According to The Washington Post fact checker, in his first two years, Trump averaged nearly seven false or misleading claims each day. He set the global agenda, but the effect on his credibility was devastating. Presidential tweets that proved to be demonstrably false, undercut America's credibility and reduced its soft power. The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed (as reflected in interviews or polls), not dollars spent, or number of messages sent.

Domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to others' views, or are based on a narrow conception of national interest can undermine soft power. For example, there was a steep decline in the attractiveness of the US in opinion

polls conducted after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the 1970s, many people around the world objected to the US war in Vietnam, and America's global standing reflected the unpopularity of that policy. What does this mean for the future of American soft power?

Sceptics argue that such cycles show that soft power does not matter much; countries cooperate out of self-interest. But this argument misses a crucial point: cooperation is a matter of degree, and the degree is affected by attraction or repulsion. Other countries act from their interests, but attraction (or its absence) can produce an enabling or Domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, or are based on a narrow conception of national interest can undermine soft power. disabling environment for their choices. For example, when George W. Bush appealed to his friend Vicente Fox for support during the Iraq War, the unpopularity of American policies inhibited Mexican cooperation. Similarly, unattractiveness prevented the Turkish parliament from allowing American troops to cross Turkey to enter Iraq from the North.

Fortunately, a country's soft power depends not only on its official policies, but also on the attractiveness of its civil society. When protesters overseas were marching against American government policy in the Vietnam War, they did not sing the Communist Internationale but often sang "We Shall Overcome", an anthem of the US civil rights movement.

Even when Trump's policies are unattractive, many people outside the US remain attracted by American films, science, universities, companies, and foundations. Many people in democracies are also attracted by the resilience of America's independent courts and free press that stand up to presidential power. If Trump erodes the independence of civil society, or the resilience of the checks and balances in the political system, the loss of soft power will be deeper and longer-lasting than what we have seen so far.

As I show in my forthcoming book, "Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump", the current president is not the first to lie or to pursue a myopic conception of America's national interest. Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush had strong negative effects on American soft power, but the country recovered. Given past experience, there is every reason to hope that the US will recover its soft power after Trump. Though global trust in the US has been damaged, a return to more far-sighted policies and better public diplomacy would certainly help in the recovery of that trust. And with it, improve America's relative soft power standing in the future.

Introduction:

A country can gain or maintain power through mechanisms that are broadly classified as "hard" or "soft" power. Writing about the latter, Antonio Gramsci was inspired by how Mussolini had maintained power in Italy in the 1930s. The Italian people's willingness to accept the government's values kept Mussolini in power without the use of force. Gramsci described this as a form of **cultural hegemony** (a **culturally**-diverse society can be ruled or dominated by one of its social classes. It is the dominance of one social group over another, e.g. the ruling class over all other classes). This can be interpreted as a use of **soft power**. Successful use of soft power explains why the UK, while no longer a global superpower, continues to exert considerable influence around the world.


This soft power has 3 main features:

History – Families from all over the world send their children to study at British Universities – particularly those in London, Oxford, and Cambridge.

Culture – The BBC is a major international broadcaster and besides a rich literary. Artistic and musical legacy, English is the most widely spoken language after Mandarin.

Diplomacy – The UK has one of the largest networks of embassies and high commissions. British diplomats are widely respected, and Britain has been hugely influential in imposing economic sanctions e.g. Russia after its involvement in Ukraine.

The failure of the USA to react to Human Rights abuses in countries such as Syria, in 2013-16, has called into question the effectiveness of soft power. The historian Niall Ferguson asserts that superpowers should stand astride the world like a **Colossus**, recognising that hard power, in the form of military force and economic change is vital.



Geostrategic Theory:

Studying the geographical expression of power is a branch of Geography known as **geopolitics**. Geographers are interested in the changing shift of global power, and the mechanisms for maintaining it. **Mackinder's Heartland Theory** was established in 1904. He believed that whoever controlled Europe and Asia, would control the world. He identified a heartland called the **world island**, from Eastern Europe into Russia, at the centre of which was a **pivot**.

Mackinder believed that 3 things determined power in this region:

- 1. Whoever ruled the most strategic part of Europe would command the heartland.
- 2. Whoever ruled the heartland would command the world island i.e. Europe and Russia
- 3. Whoever controlled the world island ruled the world.

The further away from the heartland a country was, the less influence it would have.

Calculating Power Indexes:

A skill you need to develop is the ability to calculate power indexes using data from multiple data sets. There are two parts to the process, scaling (normalisation) and ranking.

Below you will see a table of data for several countries. This selection of data would typically be used to measure a country's **soft power index score**.

	Gender equality	Normalised gender score	Labour participa- tion	Normalised labour participa- tion score	Education spending (% of GDP)	Normalised education spending score	Combina- tion of index scale scores	Ranking
Norway	1.00		68.70	0.04	6.60			
UK	0.97		68.70	0.04	6.00			
USA	1.00		68.90	0.05	5.20			
Japan	0.96		70.40	0.12	3.80			
China	0.96		67.80	0.00	3.80			
Russia	1.02		71.70	0.18	4.10			
Ethiopia	0.84		89.30	1.00	4.70			
Philippines	0.98		79.70	0.55	3.40			
Mozambique	0.88		82.80	0.70	5.00			
lvory Coast	0.81		81.40	0.63	4.60			
Malaysia	0.95		75.50	0.36	5.90			
Georgia	0.96		75.10	0.34	2.00			

As you can see we have data for gender equality, labour participation, and education spending. **Normalisation** is a process of scaling data in different data sets; this ensures that each set has the same variance. This allows us to make a direct comparison between countries.

How to Normalise Your Data:

Step 1: Working with the data for *gender equality,* choose the country's score that you wish to normalise (In this example we will use Norway). You must calculate the difference between Norway's score and the country with the lowest score in that column.

Norway: ______ - _____ = _____

Step 2: You now need to subtract the lowest gender equality score from the highest gender equality score.

_____=____=

Step 3: Divide your result for step 1 by the result you got in step 2 to calculate your normalised score.

_____÷____=____

Step 4: Repeat the process to complete the table.

Once you have finished, add up the total normalisation scores to complete the column titled "combination of index scale scores". You can then **rank** them from 1 - 12. Rank 1 will have the lowest score.

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How did Britain manage to acquire an empire?

The British Empire is mentioned on page 26 of your textbook. Here is a text which gives you more information about the growth of the empire.

At the end of the 19th century Britain's position as the world's greatest imperialist power was uncontested, and the expression "the sun never sets on the British Empire" was coined – meaning, literally, there was always some part of the empire on which the sun was shining, and, figuratively, that the empire would never end. One can understand the thought – after all, between 1880 and 1900 new colonies were added to the empire, and the population of the empire had grown by a third. Through its colonies and dominions, Britain exercised authority over one fifth of the world's entire population.

How did Britain manage to acquire such an empire? It is a complicated story and there are no easy "reasons" or "causes". One thing is certain: at no time did the government in London sit down and look at a map of the world and say, "We want that...and that...that." Instead, the empire grew in fits and starts. Three basic factors made it possible: people, skills, and resources.

The people who built the empire often did not mean to they were simply involved in a whole range of activities which took them overseas to new lands. Explorers explored. Traders traded. Ship-owners and sailors carried trade to and from harbours all over the world. Britain was the world's leading trader, and even after about 1870 when the USA and Germany had overtaken Britain as industrial nations, Britain continued to be the world's leading trading nation. Bankers invested money in trading projects. Above all, people emigrated. From 1800 to 1900 Britain's own population increased fourfold. Earlier, it was feared that emigration might deprive Britain of the people it needed. No one worried about this with such a huge population increase at home. Between 1815 and 1880, about 12 million Britons emigrated, most of them either to British colonies or to the USA.

The skills were primarily sailing skills, financial skills, medical skills, and technological skills. Sailing skills made it possible to reach places all over the world. Financial skills allowed the City of London to lend money to traders and others. Medical skills reduced the dangers of tropical diseases. Technological skills – notably the production of trains, steamships, and underwater and overland telegraph – shortened distances that had once seemed unmanageable.

The resources were ships to cross oceans and steamboats to sail up rivers and money that could be invested by the City of London in all sorts of commercial operations – England was the first country to develop a modern financial and banking system. The industrial revolution gave Britain low-cost, factory-made goods for which it wanted world markets. If

and when things got difficult, there were military resources to protect the British traders: a navy that was the world's strongest, and soldiers that could be stationed overseas.

None of these factors – people, skills, resources – alone explains the growth of the empire, and most historians today reject the belief that a single theory can account for the growth of the British empire; instead, they study the edges and corners of the empire and recognise how different the story was in different places.

Ruling the waves

Trade and naval power went hand in hand in the sense that the navy could send a warship to any British "interests" that were in trouble, or two warships, or a garrison of soldiers who could build a fort. This was the period when Britain's navy "ruled the waves" and could control sea traffic almost anywhere in the world, fighting off competitors like Holland and France, and at times using a form of piracy, such as when warships were sent up Chinese rivers to force China to import opium. The best example of empire building is India, where, until the 1850s, trade was organised and protected by a series of arrangements with local elites by which the East India trading company "ran" parts of India. Britain chose to take over the government of India after 1858, when the Indian Mutiny collapsed. India became the most important colony – the "jewel" in the imperial crown. To ensure safe access to India, Britain established control over a series of ports and islands on the sea route. This, too, was typical. Many outposts of the empire were established to protect trading routes and to provide coaling-stations for naval ships.

Once direct imperialism was the chosen policy for any part of the world, it was not halfhearted. British officials took over government; British engineers took over major construction projects such as sewage systems for towns and railway systems; British administrators organised local government, and so on. Clearly, with this sort of commitment, Britain's impact on its colonies was enormous and lasting.

Maintaining Power – British Empire

Military	Economic	Political	Cultural

1815-1914 – The time period known as Britain's 'Imperial Century' where the empire was had hegemony with no serious international rival other than Russia in central Asia. It was also a period of time known as Pax Britannica (British Peace) where the Empire acted as a global police force imposing peace along its trade routes around the world. Political agreements were made globally such as with Arab rulers who agreed to end support for piracy and to give up their right to wage war at sea in return for British protection. Ultimately this led to an 'informal empire' where the British had control and therefore British merchants had an advantage over trade in countries such as China, Siam, and Argentina.

1815-1912 - Britain being an island nation invested heavily in its navy and became a naval superpower. Its naval dominance was projected worldwide and meant that Britain controlled the seas and therefore the trade routes both within and outside of its empire. The Empire had unparalleled shipbuilding capacity due to its leadership of the Industrial Revolution, it was not until Germany outpaced the UK in building Dreadnoughts that there was another navy able to challenge the Royal Navy in battle.

1823 – Monroe Doctrine, supported by the British Empire, became a formal policy of the USA. The policy was to repel further colonisation of the America's and extend the USA's influence over the America's. The British Empire agreed with the policy and used its navy to enforce it. This was because the British were heading towards the policy of 'Fair Trade' and away from mercantilism, if the Spanish continued to colonise South America the Empire's trade could be disrupted.

1840 - 1920 – Policy of Free Trade throughout the Empire through the belief that cheap goods encouraged economic growth through lower taxes to the business and also driving consumption through cheaper access to goods. Before 1940 the world's trade was driven by mercantilism where exporting goods outside of the empire had tariffs and restrictions.

1839-42 – The First Opium War. The Chinese refused to legalise the trade of opium and confiscated a shipment of opium in Canton from the British East India Company. The British Government wanted to have balanced trade with China (they bought lots of tea from China but sold very few goods to China) and the navy was used to bombard Chinese ports (gun-boat diplomacy) until they agreed to open 5 key ports to British traders, reduce tariffs to the British and give the valuable port of Hong Kong to the Empire.

1848-1849 – Second Anglo-Sikh War. Tensions between the Sikh Empire and British East India Company (BEIC) rose as the BEIC militarised the Punjab border. Eventually the Sikh Empire was goaded into invading the British Colony. Soldiers from the BEIC eventually beat the Sikh Empire and took over the Punjab which became the 'North-West Province'.

1857 – Government of India Act – after yet another rebellion the British Empire sought to maintain control by altering the governance of its Indian colony. It did this by identifying itself as the Imperial government based in London, it had a central Indian government in Calcutta, and it had 6 smaller governments in each of the Indian provinces it controlled. This allowed those in control to react quickly to various events.

1867 – Self-government – Canada was granted self-government from the Empire followed by Australia and New Zealand in 1907.

1871 – Unification of Germany – The unification of Germany presented a threat to the Empire and the British Army was expanded and modernised both at home and throughout the colonies.

1875 – Suez Canal – The British Empire bought part of the Suez Canal from the leader of the Egypt becoming joint owners with France. Egypt was not under British Empire rule until 1882 as it became important for passage to India.

1877 – Cricket – The first international cricket match was recorded.

1875-1900 – The Scramble for Africa began, this was important for the Empire due to an increasing population and wealth and demand for products such as cocoa, tea, copper, and cotton. Both Egypt and South Africa were used as points in which to exert control. South Africa was consolidated as a colony in case the Suez was no longer under Empire control.

1858-1902 – The All Red Route was the global system of telegraph poles which connected all the colonies and would require 49 cuts to isolate the UK. This worked well during the First World War whereas the German network was quickly cut off.

1890 – 1907 – 'Splendid Isolation' was the foreign policy the Empire followed due to the reluctance to enter into any permanent European alliance or commitment to other great powers, the Empires power was at sea, less so on land. This policy weakened with the unification of the Germany Empire in 1871 and formally ended with the 1907 signing of the Triple Entente (Britain, France, Russia) which was signed as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary).


Introduction:

At its height, the British Empire extended over about a quarter of the world's land area and ruled a fifth of its population. Its origins can be traced back to the late 1400s, when England was competing with Spain and Portugal to explore the world. Christopher Columbus discovered America and Sir Francis Drake defended claims to West Africa. Early colonial actions included settlements in Ireland by English and Scottish Protestants and the establishment of settlements in the Caribbean and North America, along with the slave trade between west and central Africa and the Americas. Rivalry with other European powers led to the Anglo-Dutch Wars in the 1600s, and a long history of war with Spain and then later France.

Like other European countries, Britain established trading companies to finance voyages to search for valuable commodities, such as spices from the East Indies and India. These raw materials were brought back to British cities such as Liverpool, Bristol, Hull, and London, driving the Industrial Revolution. In 1875 Britain bought the largest shareholding in the Suez Canal and subsequently occupied Egypt. The Empire grew to include New Zealand, Australia, India, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), as well as large expanses of west, east and southern Africa. For much of the 1800s Britain was unchallenged by any other superpower.

Patters of Power – Colonial (Direct) Control

The British Empire worked by direct colonial control. The steamship and telegraph were new technologies developed to help maintain the empire. The so-called "All Red Line", an early precursor of the internet, consisted of a network of underwater telegraph cables, for example under the Atlantic Ocean from the UK to North America. British cultural values and the legal system, together with the English language, sports such as cricket, football, and rugby, as well as British inventions such as railways, were introduced around the world. This facilitated the growth of more complex trade networks and links.



Britain's policy of "splendid isolation" during the imperial era meant that, although it had almost total global control, it played little part in European politics except for maintaining the balance of power and participating in the "Scramble for Africa" in the late 19th Century – which divided land arbitrarily along lines of latitude and major physical geographical features. The British army helped defeat China in the Opium Wars to ensure that Britain would enjoy favourable trade arrangements with China. Occasional rebellions were put down by force, followed by more direct rule; for example, the Indian rebellion of 1857 concluded with Queen Victoria being crowned Empress of India.

By 1914 Britain's Empire was becoming overstretched and was facing competition from rapidly industrialising Germany. Although by the end of WW1 Britain had gained control over additional territories, including parts of the Middle East, the idea of empire was now being questioned:

- Increasing agitation in Ireland for home rule since the close of the 19th century had led to a guerrilla war against British rule and the eventual creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 and the separation of Northern Ireland which remained part of the United Kingdom.
- Discontent in India over the killing of hundreds of Punjabis at the Amritsar Massacre in 1919 led many in Britain to question the morality of colonialism.
- People in other countries also showed dissatisfaction and declared independence, including Egypt, Australia, and South Africa.

WW1 saw the growth of the US and Japanese naval power, challenging Britain's control of the seas, forcing the country to make choices regarding its international priorities.

These were the first signs of the world becoming multi-polar. By the time Britain emerged from WW2, near bankrupt and dependent on US support, the country was facing rising anti-colonialism around the world. One consequence of the dismantling of European empires was that the colonial boundaries – which often did not consider cultural frictions – became the borders of new countries. For example, Palestine was split into (Jewish) Israel and (Arab) Palestine, while (Hindu) India was separated from (Muslim) Pakistan and Bangladesh.

https://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/liverpool.htm

Rise and Fall of the British Empire

Contributed by Tim Hughes

The Rise of the British Empire

The British Empire was the first genuinely global empire, an empire that ranged, at times, from the American colonies in the West, Australia and New Zealand in the East, Canada and her dominions in the North and huge chunks of Africa in the South, including Egypt and Rhodesia. These huge landmasses, and many other smaller islands and places besides, were to be shaped, controlled, dominated, and otherwise brought under the dominion of a nation which, prior to colonial ambitions, was a small and perhaps dull and uninspiring set of countries. That the British Empire significantly kick-started the world into the modern era, and gave the world a unifying language is not really in dispute; but the truth behind the image certainly is, and the ugly reality behind the ever-polished and very-rarely challenged veneer of respectability the British, and hence the British Empire, in some quarters have tried to maintain.

Where do we begin? At the beginning. Far from Britain being historically a never-ending line of tyrants and wayward rulers, Britain has been, to some degree at any rate, a parliamentary democracy that reigned in kings and queens and rulers, and was the first to have a popular revolution, under Cromwell, in Europe. The Englishmen who started the first serious forays into venture capitalism, were little more than pirates and adventurers who plundered the Spanish main and wanted a slice of the wealth flowing out of the New World, of which ventures were often backed by Royal decree. Here begins the roots of the British Empire.

From ideas of empire rose the ideas of capitalism, free trade, enforced labour, rigid hierarchies, the criminalisation of the poor, and severe and almost unquestioned divides between those who had and those who did not have, both at home and abroad. That this process made many people seriously wealthy cannot be disproved, that it also made many many more people far worse off is, in reality, more important an issue to deal with.

That the legacies of empire are far reaching can be seen only too clearly in places like Ireland, Africa, India and much of the Middle East at this present time. It is when racism and prejudice are broached, that the Empire seems to come into its own; Ireland was the first serious attempt by the British Crown and Parliament, to begin a process of English colonisation, whose colonists would then take over the 'wilderness' of Ireland and use the land more profitably. The Irish were treated like the native 'Indians' a little later in America, as being 'in the way', nomads who were uncivilised, and, more importantly, who did not utilise, and particularly, did not 'own' the land they wandered. This is an important point to understand, and much rests on this 'belief', both in Ireland, America and much later Africa and other nations. The inference being, in English and British mindsets, that because nobody 'owned' the land, it was up for grabs. A simple point, but much laboured, and was the intellectual argument for such colonialism. The Englishman was a gentleman, the Irishman, and henceforth many other nationalities, was an uncivilised and uncultured brute. This 'excuse', compounded with other often faulty reasoning and intellectualising, was the reason why Englishmen sought to establish colonies that would make them

enormous profits, buy themselves into the gentry, win fame and glory, and establish their names. Such ideas of civilisation and 'gentlemanliness' being used to excuse ethnic cleansing, land grabbing, slavery and untold injustices have their reflections in most if not all empires, and are seen clearest in the 'Nazification' of early 20th century Germany; when notions of superior and inferior excused the most barbarous and evil of practises.

Africa only really became a serious issue to the Empire at the end of the 19th century, but for centuries prior to this, was a source of wealth for Britain and Europe, primarily because of the slave trade, but also as a market for European goods, and as another outpost of European colonialism from the early 1600's. According to Iggy Kim and Peter Boyle, in their article How the rich invented racism, racism has its historical roots in the development of capitalism. Slaves could be purchased cheaply and brought in unlimited numbers from Africa. In the racist mode of reasoning, the next logical step was to conclude that, somehow, blacks must have been "naturally" inferior to whites. Two other factors assisted the advance of racist ideas in the 19th century: the expansion of European capitalism to include huge colonial empires in Asia and Africa, and the development of early theories of human evolution. Gross manipulation of the latter helped justify the new global oppressive relations of imperialism.

Liverpool Docks

Ports like Liverpool, Bristol, Cardiff and Glasgow, amongst no doubt many others, grew rich and powerful as a result of this trade, allowing merchants to expand, bankers to grow wealthy, companies to prosper, and many individuals to make more money than they knew what to do with; it was indeed a profitable trade, and also, more and more, a trade that is hidden from history. It is no exaggeration to say that the slave trade, and the profits it created, helped cement the emergence of Capitalism, Britain's pre-eminence as a world empire, the beginnings of Britain's industrialisation, and the creation of a class of capitalists with untold wealth and power at their fingertips. Such unequal relations of wealth and power, creating vast divisions in Britain and around the world, would become uncomfortable realities for many people, and sooner or later would be justified or explained away in high-blown intellectual and scientific terms.

Desmond Kuah, of the National University of Singapore, writes that by the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the British Empire was the largest and richest empire in the world. This naturally gave rise to the belief that the British themselves were the chosen race chosen to bring the benefits of western civilization to the backward areas of the world. With India's conquest, in ways militarily, economic, social, ethnic, and even religious, came then, as with other dominions, justifications and intellectual reasoning about British, and White European, 'natural' superiority and the 'natural' inferiority of conquered people's around the world.

In understanding and accepting the real reasons for empire, then a better understanding can be made of seeing the inherent divisions within the imperial system, and how racist and classist propaganda, to name but two, was heaped on top of centuries of brutal, merciless and systematic injustice for one real purpose, to make capital gain.

Anthony S. Wohl, Professor of History at Vassar College writes that during the Nineteenth Century theories of race were advanced both by the scientific community and in the popular daily and periodical press. In his article The Function of Racism in Victorian England Professor Wohl goes on to argue that "to denigrate or point up the bestial, brute, savage nature of an outside group is to point up our own advanced state and protect ourselves against inner fears or tensions. Racism and class prejudice, in other words, not only serve as agents of political power, but also serve as buffers between a community and a nature that seems to be getting too close to it for psychological comfort."

Social Class ideas in Britain followed many of the arguments that racist classifications did and were equally pored over by scientists and social theorists. In Britain, class became an issue by the early 19th century. These classes were identifiable groups and were most notably understood in terms of inequalities in wealth, social power, political power, life expectancy, living conditions, types of job and so on. Race and Class often overlapped, as the Irish would be seen as inferior both racially and in terms of their low-social status. David Cody, Associate Professor of English, Hartwick College argues that early in the Nineteenth Century the labels "working classes" and "middle classes" were already coming into common usage. The old hereditary aristocracy, reinforced by the new gentry who owed their success to commerce, industry, and the professions, evolved into an "upper class". Beneath the industrial workers was a submerged "under class" which lived in poverty. It could be argued that in some cases, this structure is still viable even today.

The Fall of the British Empire

Now, I wish to look at how Britain's decline as a world empire, effectively in the middle of the 20th century, was and has been in many cases a smokescreen for Britain's continued economic domination of large parts of the globe, and how Britain itself to this very day exercises divisions and injustices that impoverish large sections of the British populace, both ethnic British and other ethnic minorities. And how tying all this together, and at its very heart, there is a moral vacuum at the heart of those who control mass wealth and power at all costs, even the cost of a peaceful world.

The reality of empire, both historically and at present, are so far from the rosy picture of a benign and benevolent undertaking, that an unlearned person might think they were discussing two completely different things. The reality of empire is power, and control of wealth and resources, always stacked unevenly and unjustly in favour of small groups of people. The story of the British Empire, now as well as then, is the story of how this power was and is wielded to create class and wealth divisions in Britain, and how these divisions were and are promoted around the world, in 'superior' white and 'inferior' natives and dark-skinned peoples of the world, all for an agenda of mass profit and wealth creation for a relative few, and the vastly unequal power relations such wealth creates, in Britain and the rest of the world. How these divisions are promoted, accepted, subtly held onto, and reinforced by supposedly benign British institutions like the Church of England, the Judiciary, the Armed Forces with their rigid class structures and so on. In the days of Empire on the global scene, it was a belief that the white man was superior, sensitive, intelligent and fit to govern, but in Britain itself, it was a class structure, again promoted as benign, that held sway; the effete middle and upper class gentleman holding wealth and power and exercising dominance over his social inferiors. Class and Race are still at the heart of a divided Britain, and a divided world. On these injustices were huge fortunes made, lands appropriated, empires carved out, colonies settled and wholesale destructions of cultures and ways of life.

It is easy to attack a structure because you are not part of it, or because you or your family and so forth never really benefited from these structures. But it is the moral issue that is at stake here; the morals surrounding slavery, plantation systems, factory systems, enclosure acts, criminalisation of those left out of the enormous wealth created by Britain for centuries. Yes, it may be an issue of envy, but it is also one of injustice heaped upon further injustices, and of institutions in Britain like the Judiciary and the established Church of England, who rather than speaking out compounded the guilt by being ineffectual, obscure and often mouthpieces for the power and injustices meted out. The heart of the myth is the fallacy of English fair play and justice. A mere glance at history, and at present day affairs shows there is only greed and naked self-interest, compounded with injustice and a lack of any real morals whatsoever. The real enemy is injustice.

In Mark Curtis' eye-opening book 'Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World', the realities of British power and greed are encapsulated in factual chapters, which have been written after studying declassified information of Britain's role in a number of global situations. This is truth, from the horse's mouth so to speak, and it does not make particularly edifying reading. As well as his page by page dissection of well-spread lies by the British elite when tackling popular uprisings in Africa, British Guiana and many other places throughout the 20th century, he criticises the media, even the liberal, intellectual and so-called independent media and journalists, for largely ignoring the injustices sown by Britain. This speaks of a bigger picture, and of the class structures within Britain itself, where individuals have colluded and conspired to ignore unpalatable realities so long as they in some ways benefited. In present day terms, we might well ask why in Britain, at the heart of a modern democracy, there are vast gulfs of wealth disparity between rich and poor, and we might ask why a country awash with wealth and resources should become even more divided than poorer countries, with an immoral class system that remains basically unquestioned at this time.

Mark Curtis writes, in his aforementioned book: "The reality is that British governments bear significant responsibility for global poverty-not only as a former colonial power that shaped many of the current unjust structures, but in their championing of a world trade system and economic ideology that enriches the few and impoverishes many more...Yet I do not think I have ever seen a media article that mentions that Britain might in some way systematically contribute to poverty in the world. Is this not extraordinary?" Remarkable certainly, and extraordinary perhaps so, but somehow this tallies with everything anyone who merely wishes to be honest about the British Empire, and about the realities of empire; those of unequal power and wealth relations, and of little or no moral culpability or responsibility. The fuel of the British Empire was not coal or wool after all, but an incredible lack of concern for those trampled underfoot in the quest for bigger and bigger profits.

And just as Britain, like America, has traditionally backed right-wing dictators and rightwing monarchies and powers in other countries around the world, those regimes often denying even basic rights to the mass of their own people, so Britain has learnt these injustices well, and kept large amounts of British people in the dark, and in poor paying jobs, in run-down areas economically, whilst allowing other groups to prosper often unjustly at the expense of those who are politically, economically and socially oppressed. Sound familiar? I expect it does. In Liverpool at this present time, one of the major ports at the height of Britain's imperial power, the reality of wealth creation, and of British civilisation and British society is unveiling itself in 'Regeneration' and the much-touted 'Capital of Culture'. Liverpool is a working class city, a town that, whilst a relative few made fortunes and good livings, has been a city traditionally poor, with low paying employment and few real prospects for the average citizen, both historically and at this time. The ball starts rolling when rich people can make more money, and most Liverpool people, those born-and-bred, and many more besides, see in Regeneration a cynical exercise in money making, and another gravy train for overpaid yuppies, consultants, city councillors, politicians and speculators of all kinds and of every hue. I have personally interviewed lots of people in the city centre who have said they are being side lined, and basically booted out of the city to make way for overpriced restaurants and trendy wine bars, and higher paying rents. This is just another in the long phase of injustice meted out by British wealth and power. That of poor and ordinary people being side lined to make some rich people even richer, and of all the injustice and hypocrisy that all this entails; low wage economies in the world's 4th richest country, higher taxes for poor people, higher prices in Britain, an average wage in Liverpool of '9000 after the billions flooding in from Europe over the last decade and perhaps more. You may well ask why, in all of these capitalist speculations, a little more of the huge wealth floating around cannot be shared a little more fairly. And therein, in these questions, are answers to be found. They are uncomfortable answers, but true all the same, and they all point to greed, hypocrisy, injustice, breathtaking double-standards, corruption in places high and low and wilful immorality.

The aftermath of the British Empire can be seen clearly around the world, and in Britain itself, divided by unjust class and racist systems, and particularly in the 'gold rush' speculations of Liverpool's Capital of Culture. It's heart is empty, and its morals are non-existent.

The Emergence of a Bi-Polar World:

Different patterns of power bring varying stability and risk. Colonialism gave the UK political and economic power, which lasted for decades, but there were underlying historical developments that would ultimately challenge this:

• Rapid American Industrialisation after the 1860s challenged British economic power. Transcontinental rail links – and the exploitation of huge reserves of coal and metals (and later oil) – gave the USA an economic power base which allowed it to overtake the UK economically by the 1880s.

• The Russian Revolution of 1917 created a massive new federal state = the USSR or Soviet Union – and communist governments under Lenin (1912 -24) and Stalin (1924-53) undertook massive and rapid industrialisation. By 1941, the USSR had overtaken the UK as the world's second largest economy, and as a result was able to resist the German onslaught in WW2.

By 1945, a bi-polar – two sided – world had emerged, with the USA and the USSR establishing themselves as global powers. Power was maintained militarily, politically, economically, and culturally.

Maintaining Power during the Cold War:

Since the end of WW2 and the beginning of the neo-colonial period, countries have exercised power in multifaceted ways:

Militarily: Independence was not an easy process for some countries, and in some instances was accompanied by civil unrest and war, for example the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the IRA terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland and a fierce guerrilla war in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) during the 1960s and 1970s following the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority white regime there. Britain continued to use military force to exercise influence in many countries. Britain, sometimes together with the USA, intervened militarily in many countries, including the Falkland Islands, Sierra Leone, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Politically: During the Cold War, the USA attempted to prevent the spread of communism beyond China and Russia. Its policy of "containment" was an attempt to persuade countries that might be influenced by communism to choose a capitalist free market approach to economic and government. Between 1948 and 1951 the US Marshall Plan provided aid to the UK, France, and Germany for rebuilding as well as stimulating trade to help US industries.

Economically: The IMF and World Bank were set up to provide aid to developing countries in the form of "structural adjustment programmes" to ensure the governments reformed their countries into pro-Western democracies. Other forms of aid are often given with "strings attached", forcing recipients to spend money in the ways donor organisations want them to.

Culturally: Western culture has continued to spread around the world through globalisation processes such as the internet. British sports such as cricket, tennis, rugby, and football have remained key aspects of culture in many former colonies. Western music, books and architecture can be found around the world, with many TNCS

operating globally. Increasingly however, TNCs are emerging from BRIC countries and the Gulf States. They are able to compete on the world scale and they are threatening the domination of US, European and Japanese TNCs.

Stability:

It is interesting to consider which type of geopolitical polarity is the most and least stable. There is no simple answer.

• A unipolar world dominated by one hyper power might appear stable, but the hyper power is unlikely to be able to maintain control everywhere, all the time, which could lead to frequent challenges by rogue states not accepting of the hyper power's hegemonic position.

• A bipolar world could be stable, as it is divided into two opposing blocs. Stability will depend on diplomatic channels of communication between the blocs remaining open and each superpower having the ability to control countries in its bloc; breakdown of control and/or communication could lead to disastrous conflict.

• Multi-polar systems are complex as there are numerous relationships between more or less equally powerful states; the opportunities to misjudge the intentions of others, or fears over alliances creating more powerful blocs, are high and may increase the risk of conflict.

It could be argued that the period between 1910-1945 was a multi-polar one, and that this complex geopolitical situation contributed to two world wars. Many observers believe that the 21st century could be multi polar as countries such as India and China become increasingly powerful while the power of the USA and EU wanes.

The United States and China during the Cold War

by Warren I. Cohen THE COLD WAR COMES TO ASIA



President and Mrs. Nixon at the Great Wall of China in February 1972. (National Archives and Records Administration)

In the closing years of World War II, American military and diplomatic representatives in China recognized that civil war was likely to erupt between the Nationalist-controlled government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong. The two armed parties had put aside their antagonism, at least nominally, as they confronted Japanese invaders, but after the defeat of Japan it was apparent that they were preparing to resume the struggle for control of the country. Initially, Washington attempted to avert civil war, mediating between the two sides, and hoping to create a coalition government. When that effort faltered, President Harry Truman sent General George C. Marshall, the architect

of victory in the war against Germany and Japan, to China to try to broker a peace agreement—and to determine the intentions of the Soviet Union in Manchuria and North China.

Marshall failed in his efforts to prevent full-scale war in China, but concluded Moscow had no plan to annex Manchuria or to keep its troops in North China. Although American leaders preferred a Nationalist victory, they did not consider China sufficiently important to intervene in its civil war. Moreover, Marshall, who became secretary of state in 1947, believed the United States, having finite resources, could not afford to invest large sums of money or use millions of American soldiers in an area of secondary concern in the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the limited financial and material support Washington provided the Nationalists sufficed to intensify anti-Americanism among the Communists. In 1949, the Communists won the battle and Chiang fled to Taiwan. On October 1, Mao declared the existence of the People's Republic of China and left little doubt that he would align his country with the Soviets.

Traditionally, at least after Woodrow Wilson's experiment with "watchful waiting," the US government recognized governments, attractive or not, if they demonstrated control of their countries. The Truman administration intended to recognize the People's Republic in due course, but Chiang's American friends and others hostile to communism argued against recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing while Chiang's regime on Taiwan survived and claimed to be the true government of China. Democratic Party congressional leaders feared a backlash in the 1950 mid-term elections if the United States abandoned Chiang and could be accused of responsibility for his defeat. With CIA estimates that the Communists would invade Taiwan in the summer of 1950 and prevail easily over Chiang's forces, Truman chose to wait.

Once Chiang was defeated and the elections were past, the administration could move toward recognition before the end of 1950. Unfortunately, war broke out in Korea in June 1950 and recognition was delayed for nearly thirty years. In addition, the United States prevented the People's Republic from gaining China's seat in the United Nations.

WAR IN KOREA

The principal gainer from the war in Korea was Chiang Kai-shek. Truman and Dean Acheson, his secretary of state, had intended to abandon Chiang, but they were manoeuvred into protecting him and providing substantial aid. Uncertain of the meaning of the invasion of the South by the North Korean Communists assisted by the Soviets, American leaders announced that they were sending ships to the Taiwan Strait to prevent the war from spreading. Truman, hoping to avoid a wider war, refused Chiang's offer of troops to assist the American-led UN force that came to South Korea's rescue. But the success of UN troops in rolling back the North Korean advance, and their march through North Korea that threatened to eliminate the communist regime there and pose a threat to China, provoked massive Chinese intervention in October 1950. Surprised by the Chinese attack, UN forces were hurt badly and were close to being driven off the Korean peninsula when they were able to hold the perimeter at the southern port city of Pusan. From there they succeeded in driving the overextended Chinese back to the 38th parallel, the original boundary between the two Korean states.

From spring 1951 to spring 1953, the two sides jockeyed for position close to the 38th parallel. Before a truce was declared, the Chinese suffered 800,000 casualties and more than 50,000 Americans lost their lives in Korea—as did millions of Koreans, North and South, and thousands of UN troops who fought alongside the Americans. Once Chinese Communists were killing Americans, anger toward the Chinese mounted in the United States, and recognition would have been political suicide for Democrats already suffering from Republican charges that they were "soft on communism." The war hysteria provided the context in which Senator Joe McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) attained influence that he used to assault the civil liberties of his countrymen. In this atmosphere, America's WWII ally, Chiang Kai-shek, sought and ultimately won a new treaty of alliance that committed the United States to defend Taiwan. In the 1950s and early 1960s, massive American economic aid poured into the island while the continuing US naval presence in the Taiwan Strait precluded an invasion by the People's Republic.

ALLIANCE AND CRISES IN THE STRAIT

In 1953 Dwight Eisenhower became President of the United States and he named John Foster Dulles as his secretary of state. In the presidential election campaign, Eisenhower's supporters demanded the roll-back of communism in Asia as well as Europe. Once in office, the Eisenhower administration generally proved to be quite prudent in foreign affairs. It was unwilling to take actions in Europe that might precipitate a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Although hostile to the Chinese Communists, Eisenhower and Dulles were mistrustful of Chiang, fearful that he would try to involve the United States in a war against the People's Republic that would enable him to regain control of the mainland. They stalled in response to his effort to seek a mutual defence agreement, looking for a way to pacify Chiang's supporters in the United States without giving him what he wanted.

In Beijing, Mao and his colleagues were aware of the alliance negotiations but unaware of the reluctance of the Eisenhower administration to reach an agreement. Hoping to prevent the alliance, in 1954 Mao ordered the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu

(Quemoy and Matsu), islands in the Taiwan Strait close to the mainland but controlled by Chiang's forces. He wanted to intensify American awareness of the danger of an alliance with Chiang, but the crisis he precipitated backfired. Eisenhower and Dulles did not want to appear to retreat under pressure and they accepted a mutual defence treaty with Taiwan, hoping to deter an invasion by the Chinese Communists.

The crisis led to international pressure on the administration to talk to representatives of the People's Republic. Ambassadorial-level conversations began in 1955, but after an initial agreement on repatriation of Americans and Chinese trapped in enemy territory at the outbreak of Chinese-American hostilities during the Korean War, the talks broke down over the issue of Taiwan. The American sides demanded the Chinese renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese side insisted that the "liberation" of Taiwan was a domestic issue, to be resolved by whatever means necessary.

Unhappy about the disinclination of the Americans to continue the ambassadorial-level talks, Mao precipitated another crisis in the Strait in 1958. Dulles immediately warned that the United States would intervene if Taiwan was threatened. A few weeks later, however, he publically criticized Chiang's policy of keeping the offshore islands heavily garrisoned, expressed doubt that Chiang's force could ever regain control of the mainland, and insisted the United States was not committed to aiding Chiang to invade the mainland even if the people there revolted against Mao's rule. When polls indicated the American people were outraged at the idea of going to war to protect Jinmen and Mazu, Dulles stressed American flexibility and willingness to seek rapprochement with Beijing. Secretly, he began to explore the possibility of recognizing Mao's regime on the mainland while simultaneously continuing to recognize Chiang's government on Taiwan. This was called the "two Chinas policy," anathema to both Mao and Chiang. Soon afterward, Dulles flew to Taiwan and forced Chiang to announce that he would not use force to reclaim the mainland. There was much unhappiness on Taiwan and among Chiang's American friends.

Eisenhower contended that it was in the interest of the United States to have relations of some sort, at least commercial, with the People's Republic of China. He thought it was a mistake to force the Chinese to be dependent on the Soviet Union and that an American trade relationship with China would serve American interests, as would greater trade between America's allies and China. Dulles, however, was inclined to believe that China's dependence on the Soviets would strain their relationship and create tensions between Moscow and Beijing. Eisenhower recognized that the domestic political context of the 1950s precluded any rapprochement with China. His only significant success in furthering his vision came with Washington's acceptance of increased trade between Japan and China and between Great Britain and China. Rapprochement would have to wait until the American political climate changed.

KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Taiwan's American supporters were initially fearful that President John F. Kennedy might attempt to improve relations with China, but it was the men and women who hoped Washington's policy would change who were to be disappointed. Throughout his political career, Kennedy had been critical of Beijing and of Americans who denigrated Chiang Kai-shek. Many of his aides argued he had modified his position and that he failed to act only because of the exigencies of domestic politics, out of fear of being labelled soft on communism—especially as he moved to improve relations with the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Some were persuaded he would recognize the People's Republic in his second term, but we will never know. None of his actions in the "thousand days" of his presidency demonstrated interest in reaching out to Beijing, and Kennedy secretly promised Chiang he would use the veto if the UN voted to seat Mao's regime.

Lyndon Johnson entered the White House without strong negative feelings toward China and his administration floated several proposals to ease tensions with Beijing, but nothing came of them. The Chinese were too deeply involved in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Johnson was soon overwhelmed by the war in Vietnam. Mao, struggling to regain power and revive his revolution, was unresponsive to American overtures. China's successful test of a nuclear bomb in 1964 worried the men and women responsible for American security, especially after Mao's Red Guards ran rampant across the country and the behaviour of the Chinese people and their leaders seemed bizarre and unpredictable.

NIXON, KISSINGER, AND RAPPROCHEMENT

When Richard Nixon became president in 1969, most analysts assumed that his reputation as a staunch anti-communist precluded any change in policy toward China. Nixon, however, had concluded that policies he had supported in the past no longer made sense: The People's Republic of China was here to stay and some sort of working relationship with Beijing was in the interests of the United States. Such a course might enable him to end the war in Vietnam and, given the Sino-Soviet split, indisputable by the late 1960s, the balance of power in the Cold War might shift decisively in America's favour. In 1971, as the Cultural Revolution wound down, the Chinese agreed to receive Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser.

The Americans knew Taiwan was the central issue for Chinese leaders, and Kissinger quickly indicated that the United States was prepared to abandon the island on a politically expedient timetable. In return they hoped the Chinese would push the North Vietnamese into negotiations for a compromise peace—a peace that would allow Nixon to withdraw American forces from Vietnam without appearing to have surrendered. He and Kissinger were also confident that cooperation between Beijing and Washington would make the Soviets more amenable to easing Cold War tensions. They foresaw a triangular relationship in which Moscow would be forced to back away from confrontations with both China and the United States—and they provided the Chinese with valuable intelligence about Soviet activities.

Nixon flew to Beijing early in 1972, met with Mao and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, and both sides anticipated movement toward diplomatic recognition. In the "Shanghai Communiqué" they issued at the conclusion of the meetings they agreed to open liaison offices in each other's capital, offices that would function like virtual embassies; the Americans "acknowledged" that both Beijing and the authorities on Taiwan insisted there was only one China; and Nixon conceded that China's capital was in Beijing. Unfortunately, Nixon was caught up in the Watergate scandal and ultimately resigned. Recognition was delayed. Chinese leaders were disappointed, but nonetheless increased cooperation directed against the Soviet Union. They were also pleased to be given China's seat in the UN and by the expulsion of Taiwan from the organization.

RECOGNITION AT LAST

Recognition of the People's Republic of China and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the United States finally came in January 1979, during the

presidency of Jimmy Carter. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, was eager to increase pressure on the Soviets and outmanoeuvred bureaucratic rivals striving for détente (easing hostility) with Moscow. He had little concern for the impact recognition of the People's Republic would have on Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, wanted to use the relationship with the United States to deter Soviet intervention in the war he planned to launch against Vietnam, then aligned with Moscow. To that end, he was willing to defer his complaints about continued American arms sales to Taiwan. In return, the Americans agreed to abrogate their mutual defence treaty with Taiwan, cease to recognize its government as the government of China, and reduce arms sales to the island as conditions in the region permitted.

Neither Carter nor Deng anticipated the strong Congressional action on behalf of Taiwan that came in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act authorizing continued commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and those of Taiwan—despite derecognition. It also authorized the US government to provide the island's armed forces with whatever military aid they needed to defend themselves. Although the act did not require the United States to send its own forces to defend the island, Deng was outraged, and the issue continued to roil Chinese-American relations long after the Cold War ended.

THE REAGAN YEARS

Ronald Reagan campaigned for the presidency as a friend of Taiwan who rejected the "one China" formula and would seek to restore normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Deng and his colleagues were deeply troubled when Reagan was elected in 1980. Although he continued to make remarks offensive to Beijing after his inauguration, testing Deng's patience, Reagan did not take any steps in violation of agreements entered into by the Nixon and Carter administrations. His successive secretaries of state, Alexander Haig, and George Shultz, persuaded him of the value of a good working relationship with the People's Republic while the United States and China confronted the Soviet Union.

In 1984, Reagan travelled to China, was pleased with the encounter, and returned to Washington suggesting the Chinese leaders were not real communists. For the remainder of his presidency, relations between the United States and China thrived strategically, economically, and culturally. On the other hand, he never surrendered his concern for Taiwan and was determined to continue arms sales to the island.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

In 1989, George H.W. Bush Senior succeeded Reagan as President of the United States. He had spent more than a year as American liaison officer in Beijing and believed he was well equipped to manage the relationship with China. The Cold War was rapidly coming to an end as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev continued to alleviate tensions with the West, as he had in his negotiations with Reagan. Moscow's retreat from the Soviet empire accelerated, and peaceful change came to Eastern Europe as nation after nation shed its communist leaders.

At a moment when many people around the world could imagine the spread of freedom and democracy across the globe, students led the call for reform in China. In May 1989 they occupied Tiananmen Square, the huge square that was the centre of activity in Beijing. Similar demonstrations erupted in other Chinese cities. For several weeks Chinese leaders debated their response. Finally, Deng chose to crush the demonstrators. On June 4, in Beijing soldiers drove the demonstrators out of the square, killing hundreds as they chased them into adjacent streets. Comparable massacres occurred in some other cities, such as Chengdu in Sichuan.

In the Soviet Union as well as in the United States and many other nations, the "Tiananmen massacre" shocked millions and generated a demand that Chinese leaders be punished. In Washington, pressure for sanctions was overwhelming. Bush, convinced that good relations with China were essential to America's national security, agreed only reluctantly to sanctions—and soon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to Beijing to assure Deng of his good will. When the American media and opinion leaders throughout the United States learned of that mission—and a subsequent one—Bush was accused of coddling the "Butchers of Beijing." It was a charge that ultimately hurt him in his 1992 campaign for re-election.

By the end of 1989, the Cold War was over. The Berlin Wall, one of the great symbols of Soviet-American confrontation, had fallen. Communism was fast disappearing in Europe and in 1991 the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist. But in China, authoritarian rule by the Communist Party persisted. Deng's economic reforms were enormously successful, and the country soon emerged as an economic powerhouse. Businessmen in the United States, much like those in Japan and elsewhere, clamoured for the opportunity to buy, sell, and invest in China. Beijing recognized that it need not carry out political liberalization to be guaranteed an end to the most onerous sanctions—and it did not.

AFTER THE COLD WAR

In the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century, China's power and influence grew. Many analysts in the United States and other nations wrote of the "China threat." They feared that the rise of China would intimidate its neighbours, damage American interests in Asia, and destabilize the American-led international system. Others argued that as China's prosperity grew, it would inevitably be forced to liberalize politically, to become a middle-class democracy. Still others groped for a means to integrate China peacefully in the existing world system. In 2011, a democratic China seems unlikely, but hope persists that China's rise can be accommodated without conflict.


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Learning from China's Foreign Aid Model

China's aid strategy contradicts the Western approach but is arguably more effective in achieving development goals.

By Ron Matthews, Xiaojuan Ping, and Li Ling

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China's President Xi Jinping (L) shakes hands with Zimbabwe's President (R) Robert Mugabe while South Africa's President Jacob Zuma looks on during a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Sandton, Johannesburg (December 4, 2015).

Credit: REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko

In the 1970s, foreign aid attracted criticism for not promoting sustainable development; the call was for trade not aid. Nearly 50 years on, academic and policy discord continues unabated. For instance, in 2009 Dambisa Moyo, a Zambia-born international economist, wrote a stinging indictment of foreign aid, describing it as "dead aid." More recently, Angus Deaton, the 2015 Nobel economics prize-winner argued that "most overseas development aid is a waste and even destructive use of money" as it acts to undermine the development of local state capacity. Instead, the imperative should be to promote self-sustaining development through policies that stimulate growth, including infrastructural improvement, educational investment, technical support, and greater trading access into rich country markets.

Deaton's authoritative judgement should concern Western electorates because of the huge monies they disperse on foreign aid. According to OECD data, the United States and Japan were the world's two most generous aid givers in 2015, spending almost \$32 billion and \$10 billion, respectively. Similarly, British taxpayers would likely feel vexed at the notion that their country's aid (\$19bn) is destructive rather than constructive, not least because the Tory government is presently engaged in an explosive expansion of foreign aid, with a spending level that now almost exactly mirrors the chancellor's £12bn austerity measures following the 2007-08 global economic and financial crisis. Britain's ring-fenced foreign aid spending since that time has accelerated from £5.2bn to the present £12.2bn and is scheduled to continue to grow by 24 percent to hit £16.3bn by 2020, exceeding the projected Home Office budget. Indeed, U.K. aid generosity knows no bounds: the country spends nearly 20 percent more than Germany (Europe's largest economy); twice the sums pledged by France and Japan; is the world's second biggest donor in absolute values after the U.S. (though the latter's relative contribution represents merely 0.19 percent of its GDP); and easily fulfils its global 0.7 percent commitment, just one of only five countries to do so (all others being Scandinavian).

Reportedly, six out of ten Britons have concerns over aid — not just its scale, but also its implementation, following a constant drip-feed of disconcerting revelations that have eroded public confidence. Despite the Department for International Development Aid's (DFID) claim that value for money is the primary objective, the U.K.'s ballooning aid budget has faced criticism for targeting non-development activities (English lessons for Uruguayan footballers and for personnel who work on TV game shows in Ethiopia), funnelling aid to emerging mega-economies (India and China), spending hurriedly (£1bn in two months in order to achieve the 0.7 percent target), and also uncontrollably (aid reportedly ending-up supporting terrorist activities).

With the passage of time, Brexit may increase the U.K.'s direct control over its aid spending, but currently a sizable 37 percent of the country's aid is "lost" because it is dispersed through multilateral organizations, and often wasted on inappropriate projects, due to lack of oversight and transparency, corrupt practices, inefficient management and implementation. Such wastage is recognized, though, and the U.K. plans to reduce aid funding to UNESCO, where staff salaries swallow a remarkable 50 percent of its annual £560m budget, and to the European Commission in the run-up to full Brexit. In Europe, flaws were laid bare by a 2015 EU Budgetary Control Committee Report, which stated that over 900 aid projects worth £11.5 billion were at risk of failing to achieve their objectives or incurring serious delay. It seems that around half of the EU's annual £23 billion development aid budget has missed its target, or as the Report cryptically put it: "Every second Euro spent by the EU does not achieve what it pays for." The Report's German chairwoman was graphic in her description of aid, asserting that the money is being "thrown down the toilet."

Such problems are likely behind recent declines in the aid budgets of 12 of the world's biggest donor countries, including the United States (cuts of \$2.3bn or 7 percent in 2015-16), Australia (cuts of \$761 million or 20 percent in 2015-16, and \$170mn or 7.4 percent in 2016-17), Canada, Finland, France, Holland, Ireland, Japan, Poland, and Spain. By contrast, the U.K.'s aid spend continues to accelerate.

In the U.K., a 2015 aid policy review recommended strengthening the link between aid and national interest, as well as broadening the definitional scope of aid to include refugees, humanitarian crises, climate change, peacekeeping as well as other broader security issues. These reforms would translate into around 28 percent of U.K. aid being dispersed by government departments outside DFID by 2020. The impact of such changes is presently unclear, but the obvious danger is that development per se will cease to be the core objective of foreign aid. Rather than dilution of the development objective, perhaps a rethink of Western strategy is required, whereby the fundamental tenets of aid policy are re-examined.

Is there an alternative path? Perhaps, controversially, China's radically different aid model is worth consideration. The model contradicts just about every tenet of the Western approach, and hence attracts near-universal opprobrium, but is nevertheless arguably more effective in achieving its development goals. Stripped of ideological preconceptions and prejudices, the model offers a coherent economic diplomacy framework for promoting the development of underdeveloped states whilst simultaneously sponsoring China's national interest. Beijing's aid strategy targets poverty reduction, principally through improvements in agriculture, education, health services, and welfare facilities. Beginning modestly in the 1950s, aid flowed to North Korea and Vietnam for political purposes. Later, Deng's 1978 "opening up" policy paved the way for the Tenth Five Year Plan's (2001-05) unequivocally economics-driven "going out" strategy, linking overseas aid to Chinese investment opportunity. Although the Tenth FYP merely encouraged "going out, actively and gradually," the Eleventh FYP (2006-10) referred to "going out further" and the Twelfth (2011-15) to the need for "speeding up implementation of the going out strategy." Presently, China's 28 strategic sectors have cultivated over 160 flagship multinational enterprises that benefit from commercial contracts via foreign aid projects, especially in Africa. Investment is focused on profitable enterprise, aimed at sectors of "mutual" national economic security concern, such as food, energy, and minerals.

China's complementary investment and aid model has four broad attributes. First, there is an emphasis on China's "South-South" credentials, particularly the importance of equality, common development, and a "partnership of equals," reflecting what is held to be a "win-win" development equation. This approach is based on aid-trade-investment deals leveraging donor-recipient synergy and mutual benefit. On the one hand, aid is a mechanism for fostering self-reliant development among low-income developing states, while on the other, it aims to ensure an unfair burden is not placed on donor country citizens. Aid is thus not altruistic, but rather a crucial strand of soft Chinese power. The world's second biggest economy, China, is uniquely positioned as a developing country (with 82 million citizens mired in poverty) to offer valuable real-time development insights to shape appropriate and effective aid policies in fellow developing states.

The second major characteristic of Chinese aid is that it comes with no "strings attached." The foundations for this approach lie in the country's Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence (including non-interference), as expounded at the 1955 Bandung Conference for non-aligned states. Beijing's non-alignment banner is strengthened by its non-imperialistic and non-colonialist past and reflected through its current noninterventionist foreign policy. The resulting "Beijing Consensus" lacks recourse to conditionalities, is imbued with a less moralizing tone, and is characterized by a respect for self-determination and national sovereignty. This contrasts starkly with the West's paternalistic embrace of the "Washington Consensus," whereby aid is contingent on recipient nations agreeing to capitalist free market principles and democratic reforms, especially good governance, and human rights.

The third feature of China's aid model is that it is almost entirely bilateral, thereby retaining control over how monies are spent. State-to-state aid allows Beijing to retain ownership of the tendering process, such that prime contractorship is awarded to Chinese companies, with the preponderance of procurement sourced from Chinese supply chains. This emphasis on national interest is balanced, however, by Beijing's insistence that aid 'directly' impacts on development via sectoral biases targeting agricultural, mineral extraction, transport infrastructure and, more recently, manufacturing, as opposed to the 'indirect' western donor predilections for improvements in gender equality, human rights, transparency and empowerment.

The fourth attribute of China's aid model is that while it covers grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans, separately there is a full spectrum of wider "Other Official Funding" economic diplomacy initiatives undertaken by a plethora of government departments, including commerce, agriculture, international affairs and defense. For instance, between 2010-12 China provided technical and on-the-job training for almost 50,000 people from poorer countries, including the provision of around 300 training programs for around 7,000 agricultural officials. Additionally, Beijing's health diplomacy drive supported the transfer of 3,600 Chinese medical personnel to 54 countries to treat almost seven million patients. China also engages in international disaster prevention and relief efforts, assigning more than 30,000 peacekeepers to nine countries/regions, including Afghanistan, Haiti, and, most recently, South Sudan.

Queen Victoria crowns horself Empress of India after more torritory	1876
Queen Victoria crowns herself Empress of India after more territory	1070
acquisitions and trading concessions with India. Ethos being Britain	
was helping primitive peoples incapable of self-government – this	
legitimized Britain's acquisition of portions of central Africa and	
domination (with help from EU neighbours of China).	
Discovered Australia and turned it into a penal colony	1788
India began to self-govern and became fully independent	1935 - 1949
Losses to Japan in WWII and the need of USA to come to support replaced	1945
British influence in many areas of the world	
After ultimately successful wars with the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish	17 th Century
in the seventeenth century, Britain managed to acquire most of the eastern	
coast of North America, the St. Lawrence basin in Canada, territories in the	
Caribbean, stations in Africa for the acquisition of slaves, and important	
interests in India.	
Britain lost the American Colonies	Late 18 th Century
In 1773 the British government was obliged to take over for the financially	
troubled East India Company, which had been in India since 1600, and by	
the end of the century Britain's control over India extended into	
neighbouring Afghanistan and Burma.	-
De-colonisation of Africa and Asia accelerated, and links remaining are	1950s
linguistic (they speak English) or cultural (they play cricket).	-
Britain found itself in an extraordinarily powerful position, though a	By 1815
complicated one. It acquired Dutch South Africa, for example, but found its	
interests threatened in India by the southern and eastern expansion of the	
Russians. (The protection of India from the Russians, both by land and by	
sea, would be a major concern of Victorian foreign policy)	-
Ireland achieved dominion status (after a brutal guerrilla war) and became	1921 - 1949
fully independent (except for Ulster, Northern Ireland)	-
Until the early nineteenth century, the primary purpose of Imperialist policies	18 th Century
was to facilitate the acquisition of as much foreign territory as possible, both	
as a source of raw materials and in order to provide real or potential	
markets for British manufactures.	-
Freeing of slaves everywhere in the British Empire	1833
Canada Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish free state	1907 - 1931
become self-governing dominions.	
Abolition of slavery in Britain	1807
Elizabeth I set up trading posts in Turkey, Russia, East Indies, explored coast	17 th Century
and set up colonies in North America and Ireland.	
After WW1 Britain took control of German colonies in Turkey, Egypt Africa	1914-1918
and Middle East.	
Self-Governing Dominions come the aid of Britain in WWII	1939-1945

NATO (North Atlantia Trant, Organiantian) has any Thaill Survey at its Masterra Furrers and	10.40
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) began The U.S. and its Western European	1949
allies establish NATO, as essentially an anti-Soviet military alliance. Under the	
agreement, member European nations allow the U.S. to place missiles and set up	
military bases on their soil, within striking distance of the USSR. UK develops its first nuclear weapon, joining the USSR and the US as nuclear powers.	1952
United Kingdom Grants Independence to Sudan	1953
Stalin dies Khrushchev replaces him and denounces extremist brutal policies, frees	1953
thousands of political prisoners, eases repression, persecutes Russian Orthodox Jews,	1755
closes churches, and executes clergy.	
Warsaw Pact (Russia's answer to NATO) starts which includes Eastern/Central	1955
European nations under its influence, such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,	1755
Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany.	
Israel, UK, and France invade Egypt for control of the Suez Canal (Suez Crisis) USA	1956
pressures them to withdraw, backfires on US which is pro-Israel.	1730
After putting down communist insurgency, UK grands independence to Malaysia and	1957
Singapore. African Gold Coast also.	1737
France faces issues at home with public dissatisfaction over fighting for overseas	1958
colonies, new government comes in and offers peaceful independence to all	1730
colonies, most including Algeria take them up on the offer.	
China falls out with Russia, they preferred Stalin's communism to Khrushchev's	1959
Cyprus gains independence but only the Greek side, UN still in place on Cyprus to	1960
keep the peace between Greek and Turkish factions.	1700
Norway discovers oil and gas, propelling Norway to the top of 'quality of life' stats, oil	1960
wealth shared via government rulings to benefit all.	1700
France goes Nuclear	1960
USSR erect the Berlin Wall to keep West and East Berliners apart, East was communist,	1961
West had higher salaries	1701
UK grands independence to Jamaica	1961
USSR starts building missiles in Cuba (Cuban missile crisis) – check the atlas, that isn't	1962
far to the states for firing practice) USA threaten to invade, USSR back off agreeing for	1702
USA to remove missiles from Turkey	
US has war against Communism in North Vietnam (which was supported by China	1964
and Russia)	1701
Brezhnev replaces Khrushchev – Russian economy stagnates despite having own oil	1964
and gas and not being so affected by Vietnam war as US.	1701
US forces a coup in Greece to oust any Communist leaders via CIA, Greece	1967
becomes a policed state	1707
Suez canal is closed, UK withdraws from Arabian Peninsula colonies	1967
EC established (non-Eastern-Bloc nations in Europe join to standardise trade and	1967
economy)	
All African Colonies become independent	1968
'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, discrimination against minority Irish Catholics in	1969-1998
Northern Ireland leads to terrorist activity. Eventual ceasefire agreed, Britain	
withdraws army from Northern Ireland.	
Arab Oil Crisis – OPEC plus Egypt and Syria place an oil embargo (sanctions) against	1973
supporters of Israel. Including US, Japan and EU. Oil shock causes global recession.	
Russia searches for more of its own oil, US determines to stockpile and protect itself in	
future. All parties get more involved in Arab states, e.g. Military bases, selling military	
equipment	
The Soviet Union invades and occupies parts of Afghanistan, with the communist-	1979
Afghan government in danger of collapse.	

Argentina invades and occupies the British islands off its coast. The UK responds with its own invasion, recapturing the islands, which remain an overseas British territory to this day. Helped to topple the Argentinian military regime. (there is oil nearby).	1982
Canada becomes completely independent of the UK	1982
Free market reforms in Russia, perestroika (economic reforms) limited benefit felt (led by senior politician Gorbachev)	1983
Gorbachev replaces Brezhnev government spending increased and shortages increased, reducing tax revenues. Decentralization would also prove harmful, as various republics would withhold tax revenues. Gorbachev also introduced Glasnost, a policy of openness and transparency with the media, after the cover-up of the Chernobyl Disaster came to light. However, this backfired when the extent of past cover-ups, social failures and economic struggles were served for public consumption. These policies helped to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union, which happened under Gorbachev's reign	1984
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement Nuclear powers agree to begin the process of destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as part of non-proliferation agreement.	1985
Australia and New Zealand gain full independence from UK cutting last constitutional ties.	1986
Poland Romania, Lithuania and other soviet republics assert independence and Berlin Wall comes down (by hand, by the people)	1989-1990

Is English or Mandarin the language of the future?

By Jennifer Pak BBC News, Kuala Lumpur 22 February 2012



English has been the dominant global language for a century, but is it the language of the future? If Mandarin Chinese is to challenge English globally, then it first has to conquer its own backyard, South East Asia. In Malaysia's southernmost city of Johor Bahru, the desire to speak good English has driven some children to make a remarkable two-hour journey to school every day. Nine-year-old Aw Yee Han hops on a yellow mini van at 04:30. His passport is tucked inside a small pouch hung around his neck. This makes it easier for him to show it to immigration officials when he reaches the Malaysian border. His school is located on the other side, in Singapore, where unlike in Malaysia, English is the main language. It's not your typical school run, but his mother, Shirley Chua thinks it's worth it. "Science and maths are all written in English so it's essential for my son to be fluent in the language," she says.

The assumption that Mandarin will grow with China's economic rise may be flawed. Consider Japan which, after spectacular post-war economic growth, became the world's second-biggest economy. The Japanese language saw no comparable rise in power and prestige.

The same may prove true of Mandarin. The character-based writing system requires years of hard work for even native speakers to learn, and poses a formidable obstacle to foreigners. In Asia, where China's influence is thousands of years old, this may pose less of a problem. But in the West, even dedicated students labour for years before they can confidently read a text of normal difficulty on a random topic.

Finally, many languages in Asia, Africa and the Amazon use "tones" (rising, falling, flat or dipping pitch contours) to distinguish different words. For speakers of tonal languages (like Vietnamese) learning the tones of Mandarin poses no particular difficulty. But speakers of non-tonal languages struggle to learn tones in adulthood - just ask any adult Mandarin-learner for their funniest story about using a word with the wrong tone.

An estimated 15,000 students from southern Johor state make the same bus journey across the border every day. It may seem like a drastic measure, but some parents don't trust the education system in Malaysia - they worry that the value of English is declining in the country. Since independence from the British in 1957, the country has phased out schools that teach in English. By the early 1980s, most students were learning in the national language of Malay. As a result, analysts say Malaysian graduates became less employable in the IT sector.

"We've seen a drastic reduction in the standard of English in our country, not just among the students but I think among the teachers as well," says political commentator Ong Kian Ming.

Those who believe that English is important for their children's future either send their kids to expensive private schools or to Singapore, where the government has been credited as being far-sighted for adopting the language of its former colonial master. Nearly threequarters of the population in Singapore are ethnic Chinese but English is one of the national languages and very widely-spoken. Many believe that this has helped the city state earn the title of being the easiest place to do business, by the World Bank.

However, the dominance of English is now being challenged by the rise of China in Singapore. The Singapore Chinese Chamber Institute of Business has added Chinese classes for business use in recent years. Students are being taught in Mandarin rather than the Hokkien dialect spoken by the older Chinese immigrants. These courses have proved popular, ever since the government began providing subsidies for Singaporeans to learn Chinese in 2009 during the global financial crisis. "The government pushed to provide them with an opportunity to upgrade themselves so as to prepare themselves for the economic upturn," says chamber spokesperson Alwyn Chia.

Some businesses are already desperate for Chinese speakers. Lee Han Shih, who runs a multimedia company, says English is becoming less important to him financially because he is taking western clients to do business in China. "So obviously you need to learn English but you also need to know Chinese," says Mr Lee. As China's economic power grows, Mr Lee believes that Mandarin will overtake English. In fact, he has already been seeing hints of this. "The decline of the English language probably follows the decline of the US dollar. "If the renminbi is becoming the next reserve currency then you have to learn Chinese." More and more, he says, places like Brazil and China are doing business in the renminbi, not the US dollar, so there is less of a need to use English.

Bilingualism

Indeed, China's clout is growing in South East Asia, becoming the region's top trading partner. But to say that Mandarin will rival English is a "bit of a stretch", says Manoj Vohra, Asia director at the Economist Intelligence Unit. Even companies in China, who prefer to operate in Chinese, are looking for managers who speak both Mandarin and English if they want to expand abroad, he says. "They tend to act as their bridges."

So the future of English is not a question of whether it will be overtaken by Mandarin, but whether it will co-exist with Chinese, says Vohra. He believes bilingualism will triumph in South East Asia. It is a sound economic argument, but in Vietnam's case, there is resistance to learning Mandarin. The country may share a border with China, but the Vietnamese government's choice to not emphasise Mandarin is an emotional one, says leading economist Le Dang Doanh.

All the streets in Vietnam are named according to generals and emperors that have been fighting against the Chinese invasion for 2000 years," he says. Tensions flared up again last May over the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Anti-Chinese sentiment means that young Vietnamese are choosing to embrace English - the language of a defeated enemy. Many families still bear the psychological scars from the Vietnam War with the United States. Yet there is no animosity towards English because the founding father of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, made a clear distinction between the so-called American imperialists who were bombarding Vietnam and the American people, says Le Dang Doanh. Many Vietnamese who have lost family members during the war are now studying in America, he says. "We never forget any victim in the past but in order to industrialise and normalise a country, Vietnam needs to speak English." The Vietnamese government has an ambitious goal to ensure all young people leaving school by 2020 will have a good grasp of the English language.

But it's not hard for young Vietnamese to accept English. For some, the language offers a sense of freedom in Vietnam, where the one-party communist state retains a tight grip on all media. In a public square in central Hanoi, a group of young men are break-dancing to the pulsing beats of western hip hop. Ngoc Tu, 20, says he only listens to English music. "The Ministry of Culture has banned a lot of [Vietnamese] songs and any cultural publications that refer to freedom or rebellion but... English songs are not censored."

It is debatable whether English or Mandarin will dominate in South East Asia in the future. There are arguments for both on the economic front. But culturally, there is no dispute. Even Mandarin language enthusiasts like Singaporean businessman Mr Lee, says that English will remain popular so long as Hollywood exists. The success of movies such as Kung Fu Panda, an American production about a Chinese animal, has caused a lot of anxiety in China, he says. There have been many cartoons in China about pandas before, but none had reached commercial success, says Mr Lee. "The moment Kung Fu Panda hit the cinemas everybody watched it. They bought the merchandise and they learned English."

Lost in translation

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- Up to 7,000 different languages are estimated to be spoken around the world
- Mandarin Chinese, English, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, Russian, Portuguese, Japanese, German and French are world's most widely spoken languages, according to UNESCO
- Languages are grouped into families that share a common ancestry
- English is related to German and Dutch, and all are part of Indo-European family of languages
- Also includes French, Spanish and Italian, which come from Latin
- 2,200 of the world's languages can be found in Asia, while Europe has 260

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The Chinese were great sea voyagers, especially in the 15th century, when they roamed the Indian Ocean; Admiral Zheng He's expedition ventured as far as Kenya. But these were money-making exercises, not power projections, and they were not designed to create forward bases that could be used to support military operations.

Having spent 1,000 turbulent years consolidating its land mass, China is now building a Blue Water Navy. A Green Water navy patrols its maritime borders, a Blue Water navy patrols the oceans. It will take another 30 years (assuming economic progression) for China to build naval capacity to seriously challenge the most powerful seaborne force the world has ever seen – the US navy. But in the medium to short term, as it builds, and trains, and learns, the Chinese navy will bump up against its rivals on the seas; and how those bumps are managed – especially the Sino-American ones – will define power politics in this century.

The young seamen now training on the second-hand aircraft carrier (The Liaoning) China salvaged from a Ukrainian rust yard will be the ones who, if they make it to the rank of admiral, may have learnt enough to know how to take a 12 ship carrier group across the world and back – and if necessary fight a war along the way. As some of the richer Arab nations came to realise, you cannot buy an effective military off the shelf.

Gradually, the Chinese will put more and more vessels into the seas off their coast, and into the Pacific. Each time one is launched there will be less space for the Americans in the China seas. The Americans know this, and know the Chinese are working towards a land-based anti-ship missile system to double the reasons why the US navy, or any of its allies, might one day want to think hard about sailing through the South China Sea. Or indeed, any other 'China' Sea. China's increasingly long-distance-shore-to-ship artillery firepower will allow its growing navy to venture further from its coastline because the navy will become less vital for defence. There was a hint of this in September 2015 when the Chinese (lawfully) sailed five vessels through American territorial waters off the coast of Alaska. That this took place just before President Xi's visit to the United States was not a coincidence. The Bering Strait is the quickest way for Chinese vessels to reach the Arctic Ocean, and we will see more of them off the Alaskan Coast in the coming years. And all the while, the developing Chinese space project will be watching every move the Americans make, and those of its allies.

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China claims almost the entire South China Sea, and the energy supplies believed to be beneath it, as it's own. However, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei also have territorial claims against China and each other. For example, the Philippines and China argue bitterly over the Mischief Islands, a large reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which one day could live up to their name. Every one of the hundreds of disputed atolls, and sometimes just rocks poking out of the water, could be turned into a diplomatic crisis, as surrounding each rock is a potential dispute about fishing zones, exploration rights and sovereignty.

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As we've seen, the Chinese are everywhere, they mean business and they are now every bit as involved across the continent as the Europeans and Americans. About a third of China's oil imports come from Africa, which – along with the precious metals to be found in many African countries – means they have arrived and will stay. European and American oil companies and big multinationals are still far more heavily involved in Africa, but China is quickly catching up. For example, In Liberia it is seeking iron ore, in the DRC and Zambia it's mining copper and, also in the DRC, cobalt. It has already helped to develop the Kenyan port of Mombasa and is now embarking on more huge projects just as Kenya's oil assets are beginning to be commercially viable.

China's state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation is building a \$14 billion rail project to connect Mombasa to the capital city of Nairobi. Analysts say the time taken for good to travel between the two cities will be reduced from 36 hours to 8 hours, with a corresponding cut of 60% in transport costs. There are even plans to link Nairobi up to South Sudan, and across to Uganda and Rwanda. Kenya intends, with Chinese help, to be the economic powerhouse of the eastern seaboard.

Over the southern border Tanzania is trying a rival bid to become East Africa's leader and has concluded billions of dollars' worth of deals with the Chinese on infrastructure projects. It has also signed a joint agreement with China and an Omani construction company to overhaul and extend the port of Bagamoyo, as the main port in Dar Es Salaam is severely congested. It is panned that Bagamoyo will be able to handle 20 million cargo containers a year, which will make it the biggest port in Africa. Tanzania also has good transport links in the 'Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania' and is connecting down into the 15 nation Southern African Development Community. This in turn links into the North-South Corridor, which connects the port of Durban to the copper regions of the DRC and Zambia with spurs linking the port of Dar Es Salaam to Durban and Malawi.

China's presence also stretches into Niger, with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation investing in the small oilfield in the Tenere fields in the centre of the country. And Chinese investment in Angola over the past decade exceeds \$8 billion and is growing every year. The Chinese Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) has already spent almost \$2 billion modernising the Benguela railway line which links the DRC to the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Coast 800 miles away. This way come the cobalt, copper and manganese with which Katanga province in the DRC is cursed and blessed.

In Luanda CREC is constructing a new international airport, and around the capital huge apartment blocks built to the Chinese model have sprung up to house the estimated 150,000-200,000 Chinese workers now in the country. Thousand of these workers are also trained in military skills and could provide a ready-made militia if China so required,

What Beijing wants in Angola is what it wants everywhere: the materials with which to make its products, and political stability to ensure the flow of those materials and products. So when former president Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who had been in charge for 36 years, decided to pay Mariah Carey \$1 million to sing at his birthday party in 2013

that was his affair – as was any other way he chose to spend his vast wealth in his povertystricken country. And is the Mbundu, to which dos Santos belongs, continue to dominate, that is theirs. China does not have a view on human rights or corruption in Africa – only on economics.

Chinese involvement is an attractive proposition for many African governments. Beijing and the big Chinese companies don't ask difficult questions about human rights, they don't demand economic reform or even suggest that certain African leaders stop stealing their countries' wealth as the IMF or World Bank might. For example, China is Sudan's biggest trading partner, which goes some way to explaining why China consistently protects Sudan at the UN Security Council and continued to back its President Omar al-Bashir even when there was an arrest warrant out for him issued by the International Criminal Court. Western criticism of this gets short shrift in Beijing, however: it is regarded as simply another power play aimed at stopping China doing business, and hypocrisy gives the West's history in Africa.

All the Chinese want is the oil, the minerals, the precious metals and the markets. This is an equitable government-to government relationship, but we will see increasing tension between local populations and the Chinese workforces often brought in to assist the big projects. This in turn may draw Beijing more into the local politics, and require it to have some sort of minor military presence in various countries.

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On the plus side, the Chinese are not politically ideological, they do not seek to spread Communism, nor do they covet (much) more territory in the way the Russians did during the Cold War, and neither side is looking for conflict. The Chinese can accept America guarding most of the sea lanes which deliver Chinese goods to the world, so long as the Americans accept that there will be limits to just how close to China that control extends.

There will be arguments, and nationalism will be used to ensure the unity of the Chinese people from time to time, but each side will be seeking compromise. The danger comes if they misread each other and/or gamble too much.

There are flashpoints. The Americans have a treaty with Taiwan which states that if the Chinese invade what they regard as their 23rd province, the USA will go to war. A red line for China, which could spark an invasion, is formal recognition of Taiwan by the USA, or a declaration of independence by Taiwan. However, there is no sign of that, and a Chinese invasion cannot be seen on this side of the horizon.

As China's thirst for foreign oil and gas grows, so that of the United States declines. This will have a huge impact on its foreign relations, especially in the Middle East, with knock-on effects for other countries.

Due to offshore drilling in US coastal waters, and underground fracking across huge regions of the country, America looks destined to become not just self-sufficient in energy, but a net exporter of energy by 2020. This will mean that its focus on ensuring a flow of oil and gas from the Gulf region will diminish. It will still have strategic interests there, but the focus will no longer be so intense. If American attention wanes, the Gulf nations will seek new alliances. One candidate will be Iran, another China, but that will only happen when the Chinese have built their Blue Water navy and, equally importantly, are prepared to deploy it.

The US 5th fleet is not about to sail away from its port in Bahrain – that is a piece of concrete it would give up reluctantly. However, if the energy supplies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, The UAE and Qatar are no longer required to keep American lights on, and cars on the road, the American public and Congress will ask, what is it there for? If the response is 'to check Iran' it may not be enough to quash the debate.

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South-east of this Kazakh Border is the restive 'semi-autonomous' Chinese province of Xinjiang and its native Muslim population of the Uighur people, who speak a language related to Turkish. Xinjiang borders 8 countries: Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

There was, is and always will be trouble in Xinjiang. The Uighurs have twice declared an independent state of 'East Turkestan', in the 1930s and 1940s. They watched the collapse of the Russian Empire result in their former Soviet neighbours in the 'Stans' becoming sovereign states, were inspired by the Tibetan independence movement, and many are now again calling to break away from China.

Inter-ethnic rioting erupted in 2009, leading to over 200 deaths. Beijing responded in three ways: it ruthlessly suppressed dissent, it poured money into the region, and it continued to pour in Han Chinese workers. For China, Xinjiang is too strategically important to allow an independence movement to get off the ground: it not only borders 8 countries, thus buffering the heartland, but it also has oil, and is home to China's nuclear weapons testing sites. The territory is also key to the Chinese economic strategy of 'One Belt, One Road'. The road is oddly enough, a sea route – the creation of an ocean-going highway for goods, the belt is the 'Silk Road Economic Belt' – a land-based route formed from the old Silk Route, which goes straight through Xinjiang and will in turn connect down southwards to the massive deep water port China is building in Gwadar, Pakistan. In late 2015 China signed a 40-year lease on the port. This is part of the way in which 'the belt and the road' will be connected.

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Baluchistan is of crucial importance, while it may only contain a small minority of Pakistan's population, without it there is no Pakistan. It comprise about 45% of the country and hold much of its natural gas and mineral wealth. Another source of income beckons with the proposed overland routes to bring Iranian and Caspian Sea oil up through Pakistan to China. The jewel in this particular crown is the coastal city of Gwadar. Many analysts believe this strategic asset was the Soviet Union's long-term target when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979: Gwadar would have fulfilled Moscow's long-held dream of a warm-water port. The Chinese have also been attracted by this jewel and invested billions of dollars in this region. A deep-water port was inaugurated in 2007 and the two countries are now working to link it to China. In the long run, China would like to see Pakistan as a land route for its energy needs. This would allow it to bypass the Strait of Malocca, which is a choke point that could strangle Chinese economic growth.

In the spring of 2015, the two countries agreed a \$48 billion deal to build a superhighway of roads, railways and pipelines running 1,800 miles from Gwadar to China's Xinjiang region. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as it is called, will give China direct access to the Indian Ocean and beyond. In late 2015, China also signed a forty-year lease on 2,300 acres of land in the port area, to develop a massive 'special economic zone' and an international airport, all as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Because

both sides know that Baluchistan is likely to remain volatile, a security force of up to 25,000 men is being formed to protect the zone.

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Brazil is included in the BRICs – a group of major countries said to be on the rise both economically and politically, but, while each one may be rising individually, the concept is more fashion than reality. Brazil, Russia, India and China and South Africa are not a political or geographical grouping in a meaningful way and have very little in common with each other. If the letters had not spelt what sounds like a word then the BRICs theory would not have caught on. The BRICs hold an annual conference and Brazil does sometimes liaise India and South Africa on international issues in a sort of vague echo of the Cold War Non-Aligned Movement, but it does nit join Russia and China in taking a sometimes hostile stance towards the USA.

The North and South American giants did fall out in 2013 over an issue which still rankles in Brazil. The news that the US National Security Agency had spied on the then Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, led her to cancel a state visit to Washington. That an apology was not forthcoming from the Obama administration was testament to the fact that the Americans are irritated that China has supplanted them as Brazil's main trading partner. Brazil's subsequent decision to buy Swedish fighter jets for its air force rather than ones from Boeing is thought to have been informed by the row.

Facts – Brazil to China Exports

About \$26 billion of Brazil's exports to China in 2015 were soybeans, iron ore and oil, with the three products making up 75 percent of the total.

The relationship, however, has always been lopsided. Almost 18 percent of Brazil's imports came from China in 2015, while 18.6 percent of its exports headed there, according to data from IHS Markit. But just 2.8 percent of China's imports came from Brazil and only 1.2 percent of the mainland's exports headed there, the data showed.

Chinese-Brazilian trade alone rose from \$6.5 billion in 2003 to \$83.3 billion in 2012. As of 2014, China was the top import/export partner with Brazil, closely followed by the United States and Argentina.

in 2015, \$35 billion of multilateral financing platforms reached Latin America. \$20 billion came from the China-Latin America Industrial Investment Fund, \$10 billion in Ioans from the CDB for Latin American infrastructure and \$5 billion in new finance from the China-Latin America Cooperation Fund.

Naturally, the United States is alarmed. After all, Latin America has been the "backyard" of the U.S. since the days of the Monroe Doctrine. The American government does not relish the prospect of seeing the continent's resources shipped off to Asia.

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Central America has little going for it by way of Geography, but for one thing. It is thin. So far the only country to gain advantage from this has been Panama, but with the arrival of new money from China that may be about to change.

Modern technology means that the Chinese can see from a glance at a satellite photograph the trade opportunities this thin stretch of land might bring. In 1513 the Spanish explorer Vasco Nunez de Balboa had to sail across the Atlantic, land in what is now Panama, then trek through jungles and over mountains before seeing before him another vast ocean – the Pacific. The advantages of linking them were obvious, but it was another 401 years before technology caught up with geography. In 1914 the newly built, 50-mile long, American-controlled Panama Canal opened, thus saving an 8,000-mile journey from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans and leading to economic growth in the canal region.

Since 1999 the canal has been controlled by Panama but is regarded as a neutral international waterway which is safeguarded by the US and Panama navies. And therein, for the Chinese, lies a problem.

Panama and the USA are friends – in fact, such good friends that in 2014 Venezuela briefly cut ties with Panama, calling it a 'US lackey'. The effect of the rhetoric of the increasingly embattled country's Bolivarian revolutionary era is tempered by the knowledge that the United States is Venezuela's most important commercial partner and that Venezuela supplies around 10% of US oil imports. The energy trade between them is likely to fall as the effects of the US shale revolution kick in, but Beijing will be a willing importer of Venezuelan oil and is working on how to get it to China without relying on the route through Panama.

China has designs on being a global power and to achieve this aim it will need to keep sea lanes open for its commerce and navy. The Panama Canal may well be a neutral passageway, but at the end of the day passage through it is dependent on American goodwill. So, why not build your own canal up the road in Nicaragua? After all, what's \$50 billion to a growing superpower.

The Nicaragua Grand Canal project is funded by a Hong Kong businessman called Wang Jing who has made a lot of money in telecommunications but has no experience of engineering, let alone masterminding one of the most ambitious construction projects in the history of the world. Mr Wang is adamant that the Chinese government is not involved in the project. Given the nature of China's business culture and the participation of its government in all aspects of life, this is unusual.

The \$50 billion cost estimate for the project, which is due for completion in the early 2020s, is four times the size of the entire Nicaraguan economy and forms part of the substantial investment in Latin America by China, which is slowly but steadily supplanting the USA as the region's main trading partner. Exactly who is financially backing Mr Wang is unclear, but Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega signed up to the plan with alacrity and with scarcely a glance at the 30,000-plus people who may be required to move from their lands because of the project

Introduction:

The influence of the emerging powers BRICS countries and the G20

A global shift and outsourcing of manufacturing has increased jobs, income and consumer spending in emerging and developing countries around the world, particularly in Asia. In 2009, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown hosted a G20 summit in London, noting that recovery from a global recession required a wider group of countries to make decisions about global economic policy. Subsequent summits have attempted to reform the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and examine ways of tackling the demographic issues created by an ageing world population. There has been criticism that widening the group membership from 8 to 20 still excludes and under-represents the African continent, besides omitting some developed countries such as Norway, the world's seventh-largest contributor to UN development programmes. A wider group (G77) represents the interests of developing nations, which broadly includes all UN members except those in Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Commonwealth of Independent States, and a few other countries. In 2014 Australia proposed the exclusion of Russia from the G20 following its military action in the Crimea, Ukraine, in addition to its ban from the G8.

Russia is considered a country with economic potential, along with Brazil, India, China and South Africa, collectively referred to as the BRICS countries. The term BRIC was first used in 2001 to represent the largest emerging economies at the time; the S was added in 2010. Their relatively small influence at the World Bank and the IMF prompted their first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009. By July 2014 the BRICS announced that they would create two new financial institutions in order to increase their influence around the world:

· The New Development Bank (NDP) will compete with the IMF to finance infrastructure and other

These new institutions are intended to meet the needs of developing countries that experience frustration having to implement pro free-market reforms before being allowed access to funds from the World Bank. However, emerging countries have yet to sustain their growth, and they were badly affected by the 2008 recession: Brazil and South Africa's economies are under considerable threat, and China's economy, although still growing (at a much slower rate), is based on high levels of debt that could trigger a significant economic collapse.

The BRICS countries influence is based on their ability to purchase commodities and manufacture goods so that other countries are dependent on them. In 2011 the term MINT was first used, to refer to Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey, which are also showing signs of economic emergence (Figure 3.8). The growth of the BRICS and MINT countries suggests that a multipolar world is developing. Together these countries also play an important role in global environmental governance, not least through their contribution to global conferences such as the COP Climate Change summits, the latest of which was held in Paris in 2015.




Figure 3.8: The rise of the MINTs (in red), 2012 and 2050

The likely success of emerging countries

Overall, many regard the G20 as a useful global forum for action after the 2008 global financial crisis and ensuing recession. However, individual countries may act in more pragmatic ways in order to attain a secure financial future. The effectiveness of BRICS countries partly depends on whether developing countries look to their institutions (CRA and NDB) for alternative funding. The consequences of military incursions by China and Russia represent a significant threat to stability and the superpower balance. Table 3.3 summarises some of the key ways the BRICS countries and G20 countries might influence the rest of the world.

	BRICS	G20
Economic	 They are the only US\$1 trillion economies outside the OECD. But growth rates have slowed since 2013, and consumer spending is still low because of ageing populations. 	 Minimal impact on financial markets because discussions about change happen over a longer time-period. More money is available for the IMF, to help tackle global recession
Political	 China has become a 'mega-trader', larger than imperial Britain: commodity prices have soared while manufacturing costs have shrunk. 	 Newer members of the G20 tend not to keep agreements and commitments as seriously. Countries have started to share financial information to fight tax evasion, and agreed to monitor one another's actions.
Military	 Increased military expenditure with incursions into South China Sea and NATO airspace, Ukraine and Georgia. But direct conflict with NATO would still leave them outmatched. 	 The G20 was divided over military action in Syria – Russia and China lead opposition against the USA. Some countries are engaged in unilateral military action, for example Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
Cultural	 Cultural differences mean there is a lack of common understanding, which limits sharing of experiences. 	 Indirectly support the spread of globalisation.
omographic	Large consulations many a huge	Focused on creating economic

Table 3.3: The main ways BRICS and the G20 influence the world

Demographic	 Large populations mean a huge labour market and flourishing universities with many science and engineering graduates. However, working-age populations are starting to shrink, and not all countries are creating enough jobs. 	 Focused on creating economic growth by encouraging private business to invest in infrastructure; will help tackle youth unemployment.
Environmental	 Historic rise in greenhouse-gas emissions: three of the top four polluters are BRICS countries. Starting to lead the world in renewable energy production, for example solar panel production in China. 	 Agreed a post-recession 'green stimulus package' worth US\$1.1 trillion and commitment to remove fossil fuel subsidies. Have agreed on a need to tackle climate change and global health issues, for example ebola; but without committing money or agreeing quantitative targets.

Introduction:

Three theories attempt to explain the changes in development since 1900 and may suggest possible changes to superpower status in the future. Since the end of WW2 in 1945, the most notable changes in the geography of superpowers have been:

- The superpower struggle for global superiority between the USA and the USSR
- The decline of the colonial superpowers such as the UK
- The emergence of the BRICs and the EU as potential superpowers

Explanations of changing superpower geographies focus on a number of different theories.

Modernisation Theory:

For a country to be seen as modern, modernisation theorists say it has to undergo an evolutionary advance in science and technology which in turn would lead to an increased standard of living for all. That some countries have not modernised is seen to


be the result of internal factors such as (a) poverty and (b) inadequate culture. Modernisation theorists aimed to

a) explain why poorer countries failed to evolve into modern societies
b) reduce the spread of communism by presenting capitalist values as the solution to poverty.




b)

Modernisation theory has become increasingly influential, especially since post collapse of USSR. It was developed by Walt Rostow in the 1960s, and his five step model is summarised in the figure below.




Dependency Theory:

Developed by Andrew Frank in 1971, belief was that TNC investment in developing countries led to the exploitation of skilled labour and cheap materials, as well as creating international debt. Frank described this relationship as the "**development of underdevelopment**". Some believe that USA's influence over the WTO and IMF the country to benefit, to the detriment development countries.



World Systems Theory:

Developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1974, this theory looks at change from a wider spatial and temporal perspective. Spatially, the world's global market is divided into three sections where countries compete politically and economically; a developed core, a developing periphery and the semi-periphery where changes and tensions might occur, for example in the BRICS and MINT countries. Temporarily the world economy moves in long-term (Kondratiev) cycles, in which global depressions follow major changes in production roughly every 50-60 years. As Figure 3.11 shows, the most recent depression was in 2008. Global finance had taken advantage of the internet, and investments occurred faster and were more widespread, with increasingly risky investments and loans being made that were ultimately unjustifiable. Although governments stepped in to support struggling banks and some businesses, the loss of jobs slowed the movement of money and consumer spending, causing an economic recession.



Explaining the Dependency Theory

Despite huge global growth its still true to say that many LEDC's show little sign of catching up with the developed world. The dependency theory has been used to explain this.

Features of the Dependency Theory

A set of theories which maintained that the failure of Third World states to achieve adequate and sustainable levels of development resulted from their dependence on the advanced capitalist world.

The rich countries seek to keep the poor countries poor The mechanisms

- Keeping manufacturing in the core developed countries
- Using aid as a means of coercing developing countries to do what they are told
- Allowing polluting and environmentally damaging industries to relocate to the developing world
- Taking the best brains from the developing countries and encouraging them to move to the rich countries
- Taking unprocessed raw materials and adding value in the developed world
- Gaining political support through aid
- Often receiving more money for debt repayments than they pay out in aid

Some countries have grown rapidly despite the ideas of **Dependency Theory**

Rostow's modernization theory may help explain their growth. Countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and increasingly China have developed rapidly through export led growth.

These countries have concentrated all their exports on a narrow range of export products and undercut the products of the developed world.

Government investment was channelled into supporting a narrow range of industries To a certain extent their development was helped by American investment – for example, the Americans invested heavily in South Korea hoping that it would be a bastion against further expansion of communism.

World Systems Theory

• The whole world is regarded as one single unit

Three tiers identified in the World:

- The core large MEDC's such as European countries and North America
- The periphery the least developed countries
- The semi periphery containing the countries where rapid change is occurring for example the NIC's such as Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea (some of whom may be superpowers in the future (e.g. China, Brazil, Russia and India _ the so called BRICS), South America, Eastern Europe
- Capitalism leads to cycles of growth and stagnation in the periods of stagnation restructuring of the world system can take place allowing countries in the semi periphery to become involved in the development process. (where are we in terms of economic cycles in 2010?